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COMMENTS
ADDRESSING RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE IN EUROPE:
THE LIMITED APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 9 OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS.
In Germany they came first for the Communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Communist.
Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn 't speak up because I wasn't a Jew.
Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn 't a trade unionist.
Then they came for the Catholics,
and I didn't speak up because I was a Protestant.
Then they came for me,
and by that time no one was left to speak up.'
INTRODUCTION
After eighteen years as a school teacher at a French academy, Mrs.
Catherine Guyard suddenly found herself the object of intense scrutiny.
Why? The local parent-teacher association had called a special meeting. All
parents were encouraged to attend this meeting because as the bulletin
stated, "Your children will be entrusted to a school teacher who is a member
of Jehovah's Witnesses, who are a sect organization. We invite you to dis-
cuss this matter on September 2, 1996, at 8:30 p.m. at the school." As a re-
sult of this meeting, Mrs. Guyard was forced to resign. Later she discovered
that a tract was being distributed to the parents and posted on school infor-
mation boards with the purpose, as the judge examining the case noted, "to
harm the reputation of Mrs. Guyard and to provoke discriminatory atti-
tudes."2
Despite constitutional guarantees3 and international accords,4 a growing
1. BARLETT'S FAMEIAR QUOTATIONS 824 (Emily Morison Beck et al. eds., 15th ed. 1980)
(attributing the aphorism to Martin Niemoeller).
2. James McCabe, Testimony at the Deterioration of Religious Liberty in Europe, before
the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (July 22, 1998) (briefing at 11, on
file with author). James McCabe is the Associate General Counsel for the Watch Tower Bible
& Tract Society.
3. The fundamental right to free exercise of religion is clearly delineated in the Constitu-
tion of every member nation of the European Parliament. ALB. CONST. ch. VII ("Fundamental
Freedoms and Human Rights"), art. 2; ANDORRA CONST. ch. I (General Principles), art. 6, § i,
art. 11, § 1; Aus. CONST. art. 14(1)(2), art. 15, StGG, (Austrian Constitution provides that
those eight churches legally recognized as churches or religious communities have a right to
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concern about "dangerous cults" and religiously motivated suicides5 has
exercise their religions publicly and together), art. 16, StGG, (whereas their adherents are not
legally recognized religious confessions, are allowed to exercise their religion in houses only),
art. 63(2)StVst.Germain (However, all inhabitants of Austria have the right to exercise pub-
licly and privately any kind of religious profession freely as far as exercising it would not
contradict the public order or moral good); BELG. CONST. Tit. II (Belgians and Their Rights),
art. 19, art. 20; BULG. CONST. (1991) art. 37(l)(2)(Freedom of Religion and Belief); CROAT.
CONST. ch. III, pt. 1, art. 14, pt. 2, art. 38, art. 40, art. 41; CYPRUS CONST. pt. I (General Provi-
sions), art. 2(3), art. 18; CZECH REP. CONST. ch. II (Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms), pt. I, art.15, art. 16; DEN. CONST. Pt. VII, §§ 66-70; EST. CONST. ch. II (Fundamental
Rights, Liberties and Duties), art. 40, art. 41; FIN. CONST. pt. II (Fundamental Rights, 17 July
1995/969), § 5, § 9; FR. CONST. Title I (On Sovereignty), art. 2, Title XII (On the Commu-
nity), art. 77; F.R.G. CONST. art. 4, pt. I, II § GG (guarantees all religious communities the
same individual, corporate religious freedom), art. 140, § GG with art. 137, pt. I § WRV
(separation from the state), art. 140, § GG with art. 137, pt. Il1, § WRV (the right to church
self-determination); GREECE CONST. Pt. II (Individual and Social Rights), art. 13, §§ 1-5;
HUNG. CONST. ch. XII, art. 60 §§ 1-4, art. 61, §§ 1-4; ICE. CONST. ch.6, art. 62, art. 63, art. 64;
IR. CONST. art. 44 (Religion); ITALY CONST. (Italian Constitution, 1948) art. 8 (Religion), art.
19 (Freedom of Religion), art. 20 (Religious Institutions); LAT. CONST. ch. IV (Rights and
Obligations of a Person), art. 12, art. 30, art. 35; LIEcH. CONST. ch. IV (General Rights and
Obligations of Citizens of the Principality), art. 37; LrrH. CONST. ch. 2, art. 26, art. 27; Lux.
CONST. ch. II, art. 19, art. 20; MACED. CONST. ch. II, pt. I (Civil and Political Freedoms and
Rights), art. 9; MALTA CONST. ch. IV (Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Individuals),
pt. 40(l)(2); MOLD. CONST. ch. II (Fundamental Rights and Freedoms), art. 31(2); NETH.
CONST. ch. I (Fundamental Rights), art. 6; NOR. CONST. pt. A (Form of Government and Re-
ligion), art. 2; POL. CONST. art. 25, art. 53; PORT. CONST. (Third Revision, 1992) pt. I, title 1,
art. 13, § 2, art. 41; ROM. CONST. (1991) Title I, art. 29 (Freedom of Conscience); Russ.
CONST. ch. 2 (Rights and Liberties of Man and Citizen), art. 28; SLOVK. CONST. ch. 2, § II
(Basic Human Rights and Freedoms), art. 24; SLOVN. CONST. art. 7, art. 41 (Freedom of Con-
science); SPAIN CONST. ch. I, § 1 (Basic Rights and Public Liberties), art. 16; SWED. CONST.
ch. 2, art. I; SWITZ. CONST. art. 49(l)(2), art. 50; TURK. CONST. (1982) ch. IV (Freedom of
Religion and Conscience), art. 24; UKR. CONST. ch. II (Human and Citizens' Rights, Free-
doms, and Duties), art. 34, art. 35; U.K. CONST. pt. 6, § 18 (Freedom of Religion). See
CAROLYN R. WAH, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ENQUETE COMMISSIONS-JUSTIFICATION OF A
Two-TERED SYSTEM OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS (Lili Cole & Peter Danchin eds., forthcoming
Jan. 2000) (manuscript at 25 n. 1, on file with the Center for Study of Human Rights, Colum-
bia University).
4. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III) art. 18 (1948) (vis-
ited Nov. 5, 1999) <http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html>; Convention for Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Council of Europe, Europ. T.S. No. 5, art. 9, § I
(as amended by Protocol No. 11, Nov. 1, 1998) (visited Feb. 25, 1999)
<http://www.coe.fr/englegaltxt/5e.htm> [hereinafter Convention for Protection of Human
Rights]; Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act, Helsinki, art. 7, Aug.
1, 1975 (visited Nov. 5, 1999) <http://www.ihf-hr.org/doc/helsinki75.htm>.
5. For example, the mass suicide/homicides of 69 members of the Order of the Solar
Temple (53 members in Canada and Switzerland in 1994 and 16 members in France in 1995)
and the subway gassing in Tokyo by the Aoum group in 1995 prompted the French govern-
ment to begin inquiries into the activities of religious minorities. See James McCabe & Willy
Fautrd, Testimony at the Deterioration of Religious Liberty in Europe, before the Commission
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 9, 15 (July 22, 1998) (on file with author); see also
Kirsty Lang, Cult 'Suicide' 16 May Have Been Murdered, SUNDAY TIMES (Paris), Dec. 31,
1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File; see also Massimo Introvigne, Who is
Afraid of Religious Minorities? The Social Construction of a Moral Panic, (visited Feb. 21,
1999) <http://www.cesnur. org/panic.htm> (examines the role of the media in facilitating the
rise of the current European anti-cult movement).
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fanned the flames of religious intolerance in Western Europe. As a result,
official government inquiries are delving into the activities of religious
groups perceived to be "dangerous cults" and "psycho-groups."6
In 1995, the French National Assembly became the first European gov-
ernment to establish a Parliamentary Commission on Cults designed to iden-
tify and investigate the activities of so-called "sects" and "new religions."7
After a year long investigation, the French Parliamentary Commission on
Cults issued a final report,' identifying 172 religious groups as harmful and
dangerous cults and also urging legislative action to curtail the activities of
these "cults."9 The French government took no affirmative legislative ac-
tion,"0 but instead established the publicly funded Observatory on Cults (Ob-
servatoire inter-ministiriel sur les sectes), allegedly to alert the public about
religious groups the government deemed to be "dangerous" and to issue an-
nual surveillance reports on the activities of the groups enumerated in the re-
port as "cults."" The Parliamentary Report that launched this French effort
has no legal authority in France, but is frequently cited, both domestically
and internationally, as an official determination that the listed 172 groups are
dangerous cults.'" The result of such report has been an increase in religious
intolerance and discrimination aimed against the enumerated groups.
As a result, France, and other countries following France's lead, have
begun to strip minority religious groups of their constitutional protections by
reclassifying or redefining those organizations as non-religious entities. 3
6. See McCabe & Fautr6, supra note 5, at 6, 9 (testimony of Willy Fautr6). Instead of
recognizing all spiritual movements as "religions," European governments have begun to
categorize all religious minorities as "sects," "dangerous cults," and "psycho cults." These
labels serve to propagate the concept that there exists a legal distinction between traditional,
mainstream religions and religious minorities. As such, some governments have argued that
international and constitutional guarantees of religious liberty and freedom do not apply to
"cults" and "sects" because these groups are not "religions." See Massimo Introvigne, Black-
listing or Greenlisting? A European Perspective on the New Cult Wars (visited Jan. 22, 1999)
<http:/www.cesnur.org/greenlist.html>.
7. See McCabe & Fautrd, supra note 5, at 34, 39. Belgium and Germany soon followed
suit. The Belgium Parliamentary Commission on Sects and the German Enquiry Commission
on "So-called Sects and Psychogroups" were formed in 1996. See id.
8. The final report, also known as the Guyard Report, was published on January 10, 1996
by the French National Assembly. See id.
9. See id. Similarly, the Belgium Parliamentary Commission issued a 670 paged report
identifying 189 "sects" and recommended the creation of two governmental entities to con-
tinue monitoring the enumerated "sects." See id. at 86-87; see also WAH, supra note 3 (manu-
script at 15); U.S. Dept. of State, Belgium Country Report on Human Rights Practices for
1997 (visited Feb. 2, 1999) <gopher://gopher.state.gov:70/00ftp%3ADOS... t3A05%20
Europe%and%Canada%3A Belgium>.
10. See U.S. Dept. of State, France Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998
(visited Aug. 18, 1999) <http://www.state.gov/www/global human-rights/1998_hrp-report_/
france.html>.
11. See McCabe & Fautr6, supra note 5, at 31-34; see also U.S. Dept. of State, supra
note 10.
12. See McCabe & Fautrd, supra note 5, at 9.
13. See WAH, supra note 3 (manuscript at 2-3).
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Thus, even widely known and recognized religions are being reclassified
through legislative action as non-religious organizations, thereby precluding
them from the legal protections state-recognized religious groups receive.", If
this negative trend continues, European governments will create a two-tiered
religious system, benefiting only a few religious groups. 5 Such a system will
create "a state-sponsored, ecclesiastical hierarchy that positions 'official'
churches" recognized by the state, above "their unofficial counterparts,"
those minority religious groups ultimately labeled as sects or cults.'6
To prevent further loss of religious freedom, persecuted religious groups
should look to the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. 7 The European Convention was established in 1950 by the Coun-
cil of Europe to protect human rights in Europe.'8 Article 9 of the European
Convention safeguards religious freedom by guaranteeing freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion to all individuals within the member
states. 9 Although described as an integral component of "the most progres-
sive international institutions working for the protection of human rights,"2
until 1993, the European Court of Human Rights had not specifically ad-
dressed Article 9.2" In Kokkinakis v. Greece," and, more recently, in Ma-
noussakis and Others v. Greece,23 the European Court elaborated upon the
right of religious freedom. Thus, Article 9 may provide a basis for chal-
lenging growing religious intolerance in Europe.
Part I of this Comment examines the growing religious intolerance
prevalent in France and other Western European countries. Special attention
will be given to the role of the French Parliamentary Commission on Cults,
nationally sponsored anti-cult organizations, and recently introduced legisla-
tion aimed at promoting and legitimizing religious intolerance. Part II dis-
cusses the historical context leading to the creation of Article 9 of the Euro-
pean Convention of Human Rights, as well as the legal tests utilized to
14. "These legal protections would include, but not be limited to, tax benefits, [the] right
to own property, and the right to enter into contracts." Religious Intolerance in Europe Today:
Hearing Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 105th Cong. 34
(1997) (statement of W. Cole Durham, Professor, Brigham Young University).
15. See WAH, supra note 3 (manuscript at 2-3).
16. Derek H. Davis, Religious Persecution in Today's Germany: Old Habits Renewed,
40 J. CHURCH & STATE 741, 744 (1998).
17. See European Court of Human Rights, Historical Background, Organisation, and
Procedure (visited Feb. 25, 1999) <http://www.dhcour.coe.fr/eng/PRESS/New%20
Court/infodoc%20revised%202.htm> [hereinafter Historical Background].
18. See id. Although signed in 1950, the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms became effective in 1953. See id.
19. See Convention for Protection of Human Rights, supra note 4.
20. T. Jeremy Gunn, Adjudicating Rights of Conscience Under the European Convention
on Human Rights, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIvE: LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 305, 306 (Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte Jr. eds., 1996).
21. See id. at 309-10.
22. 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
23. 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1996).
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determine whether a particular European nation has committed an Article 9
violation. Part III considers the seminal Article 9 case, Kokkinakis v.
Greece,"4 as well as the more recently decided Manoussakis and Others v.
Greece" case and their implications on future applicants alleging Article 9
violations. Finally, Part IV explores how the application of Article 9 may
serve to alleviate the growing religious intolerance in Western Europe, by
assessing the viability of the Tavernier, Gluchowski, Piechota v. France"
petition recently submitted to the European Court of Human Rights.
I. GROWING RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE IN FRANCE
Astonished to find themselves among 172 dangerous cults listed in the
French Parliamentary Commission's report, a small non-religious group
of mental health professionals called "L'Arbre au Milieu," consulted with
their attorney to determine why they were included. During the lengthy
trial, the judge managed to elicit from the Parliamentary Commission that
they had relied on a list prepared by the Secret Service. The Secret Ser-
vice, in turn, responded that they had relied on information supplied by a
private anti-cult organization. The president of the anti-cult organization
replied that he had relied on information provided by the local branches
in different cities. In the end, it was determined that the "L'Arbre au Mi-
lieu" had been denounced by the local correspondent of the anti-cult or-
ganization in a small town. Why? Unhappy with the treatment suggested
for her anorexic daughter by a "L'Arbre au Milieu " professional the cor-
respondent exposed the mental health group as a dangerous cult.
1 7
A. Development of the French Parliamentary Commission on Cults
The French Constitution explicitly establishes the separation of church
and state and protects freedom of religion. 8 Despite these constitutional
24. 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
25. 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1996).
26. Petition for Petitioners Tavernier, Gluchowski, Piechota v. France, Eur. Comm'n
H.R., Sept. 21, 1998 (petition on file with author) [hereinafter Tavernier ].
27. McCabe & Fautr6, supra note 5, at 57-58. In October 1998, the court of Rennes
(France) declared Bernard Lempert, the founder of "L'arbre du milieu," not guilty of being
the guru of a cult. Additionally, Jacques Guyard, rapporteur of the French Parliamentary
Commission on Cults, acknowledged that this mental health group should never have been on
the French Commission's list of cults. Nevertheless, presently there exists no procedure to
remove the group from the original list. See Willy Fautr6, Human Rights Without Frontiers
(visited Nov. 4, 1999) <http://www.cesnur.org/testi/bryn/_fautre.htm>.
28. See RAYMOND ARON, FRANCE: THE NEw REPUBLIC 78, 107 (1960). "France is a Re-
public, indivisible, secular, democratic, and social. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens
before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs." FR.
CONST. tit. I, art. 2 (section on sovereignty). "All citizens shall be equal before the law, what-
ever their origin, their race and their religion. They shall have the same duties." FR. CONST.
tit. XII, art. 77 (section on the community). Despite these general provisions, the French State
subsidizes private church affiliated schools and provides upkeep for religious buildings con-
structed prior to 1905. Some cultural associations with religious affiliations may also qualify
for these government subsidies. Nevertheless, in three departments of Alsace and Lorraine,
the Jewish, Lutheran, Reformed, and Roman Catholic religions enjoy special legal status, as
1999]
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guarantees, the religiously motivated suicide-homicides of sixty-nine mem-
bers of the Order of the Solar Temple in Canada, Switzerland, and France 9
spurred the growth of anti-cult organizations' and prompted the French Na-
tional Assembly to establish the Parliamentary Commission on Cults to in-
vestigate the activities of so-called "sects" and "new religions."3'
Modeled, partly, on the recommendations of what is commonly referred
to as the European Parliament's 1984 Cottrell Report,32 the French Parlia-
mentary Commission on Cults conducted a year-long investigation and in-
terviewed numerous witnesses during secret hearings.33 The general secrecy
that enshrouded these hearings was viewed as unusual since such steps are
generally taken only in matters concerning national defense?' Moreover, le-
gal commentators described these hearings as one-sided and distinctly biased
towards the anti-cultist's position.3" During the twenty closed-door hear-
well as the privilege of having adherents allocate a portion of their income tax to the recog-
nized church of their choice. See U.S. Dept. of State, supra note 10.
29. See McCabe & Fautr6, supra note 5, at 9. The October 1994 homicide-suicide of 53
members of the Order of the Solar Temple in Switzerland and Canada was soon followed by
the December 1995 homicide-suicide of an additional 16 members discovered in the French
Alps. See Lang, supra note 5. The Order of the Solar Temple is a religious movement be-
lieved to have been established in 1976 by spiritual gurus Jo Di Mambo and Luc Jouret. The
movement is described as a secret society combining Masonic knighting ceremonies with the
pursuit of mystical cosmic forces. See Alex Duval Smith, This Week Last Year: Signs of Life
from the Cult That Kills, GUARDIAN, Dec. 28, 1996, at 2, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Bglobe File.
30. See WAH, supra note 3 (manuscript at 2).
31. See McCabe & Fautr6, supra note 5, at 31-32; U.S. Dept. of State, supra note 10.
32. In 1982, the European Parliament commissioned a report investigating the emergence
of new religions. The resulting report became known as the Cottrell Report. Although in 1984
the Cottrell Report suggested the establishment of investigatory Parliamentary Committees in
each member state of the European Parliament, the report provided no specific guidelines,
legal safeguards, or standard procedures. Additionally, the Cottrell Report recommended that
the rights of individuals and their religious organizations be subordinated in order to protect
the potential victims of unscrupulous religious organizations. As a result, there exists a preva-
lent lack of uniformity in the manner in which the member states of the European Parliament
conduct their investigatory committees. See WAH, supra note 3 (manuscript at 2-3).
33. See McCabe & Fautr6, supra note 5, at 32.
34. See id.
35. Massimo Introvigne, Director of CESNUR (Center for Studies on New Religions),
argues that these tax-payer funded anti-cult organizations exert tremendous power over Par-
liamentary Commissions and ultimately have the power to determine which groups will be
blacklisted as cults. Anti-cult ideology centers around four main tenets: 1) Cults are not relig-
ions, therefore international and constitutional freedom of religion guarantees do not apply to
cults; 2) Cults are distinguished from religions because cults use brainwashing techniques to
control their adherents, whereas religions respect their members' freewill; 3) Although most
scholars reject brainwashing theories, the real "truth" can be found by interviewing ex-cult
members who testify that brainwashing exists. Ex-members are more reliable than scholars
because scholars are hired by cults; 4) Not all ex-members are "apostates" (ex-members
turned bitter enemies of the movements they have left), therefore private anti-cult agencies are
needed to distinguish which ex-members are reliable. See Introvigne, supra note 6. The anti-
cultist assumption is that large "mainstream" religious are innocuous, and that only new,
smaller religious movements pose a danger to society. As such, only minority religious
6
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ings,3" the Commission failed to call representatives from the academic
world such as university professors, ethnologists, sociologists and historians
of religions as witnesses. 7 These exclusions permitted the testimony of ex-
members or "apostates" of the investigated groups and leaders of the anti-
cult movement to receive greater credibility. 8
In 1996, the Parliamentary Commission on Cults issued a report identi-
fying 172 groups as harmful and dangerous cults and compared these groups
to "associations of criminals." '39 Although allegedly the principal catalyst for
the parliamentary inquiry, the report did not list the Order of the Solar Tem-
ple as one of the cults under investigation.' Instead, the report included
among the 172 listed dangerous cult groups: Zen Buddhists, Seventh-Day
Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Quakers, the Church of Scientology, Baha-
ism, Catholic Charismatic Renewal, and most Pentecostal Churches."' In re-
sponse to this lengthy list, the cultural supplement to the well-known French
daily newspaper Le Monde commented that "religious groups classified as
'cults' here [in Europe] would not receive the same treatment elsewhere. Bill
Clinton, a Baptist, would be regarded as a cultist in France."'
Notably absent in the lengthy Parliamentary report is the objective crite-
ria applied by the French Commission to evaluate whether a religious or-
ganization should be considered a "dangerous cult." Thus, organizations
wishing to challenge their presence on the Commission's report have found
it difficult, if not impossible, to discover why they are listed. 3 Recent at-
tempts to probe into the criteria applied have revealed that in some cases,
even the Parliamentary Commission is unable to explain how particular
groups came to be listed in the Parliamentary Report."
In addition to the list of 172 cults, the French report also urged legisla-
tive action to restrict the activities of the listed religious groups and the es-
tablishment of government offices to monitor their activities.' Although the
French National Assembly rejected the proposed legislation on freedom of
groups have been targeted. Notably, these same religious organizations under investigation
were refused the right to obtain a transcript of the proceedings, as well as the opportunity to
present their own witnesses and rebut accusations. See WAH, supra note 3 (manuscript at 6-7).
36. See McCabe & Fautrd, supra note 5, at 32. While the French media insulted and har-
assed scholars and professors who protested the Parliamentary Commission's hearings and
subsequent report, the media remained silent as to the source of funds used to pay the anti-
cultists appearing as witnesses in cult-related court cases and hearings. See Introvigne, supra
note 6.
37. See McCabe & Fautrd, supra note 5, at 32.
38. See WAH, supra note 3 (manuscript at 8); Introvigne, supra note 6.
39. See McCabe & Fautrd, supra note 5, at 32.
40. See id. at 9.
41. See Introvigne, supra note 6.
42. Id.
43. See McCabe & Fautr6, supra note 5, at 57-58; Fautrd, supra note 27.
44. See McCabe & Fautr6, supra note 5, at 57-58.
45. See U.S. Dept. of State, supra note 10.
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religion grounds, ' in 1996 the French government established the publicly
funded Observatory on Cults (Observatoire inter-ministiriel sur les sectes)
to allegedly alert the public about groups deemed by the government to be
"dangerous" and issue annual reports on the activities of the enumerated re-
ligious groups. '7 In October of 1998, French President Jacques Chirac and
Prime Minister Lionel Jospin ordered the creation of the Inter-ministerial
Mission to Fight Against Sects (Mission interministerielle de luttre contre
les sectes)" to replace the previously established Observatory of Cults be-
cause the Observatory had not performed to government expectations.' The
new publicly funded organization was formed to "predict and fight against
actions of sects that ... threaten public order."" Notably, the newly ap-
pointed president of the Inter-ministerial Mission to Fight Against Sects, Mr.
Alain Vivien, also serves as the president of the anti-cult movement CCMM
(Center Against Mental Manipulations):" Soon after his appointment, Vivien
openly criticized the Constitution of the United States for permitting limit-
less religious liberty because the First Amendment "prohibits legislators
from making laws on proselytization... [and allows] very nefarious inter-
ests [to] hide themselves behind an allegedly religious cultism."52
This sentiment was furthered at the Council of Europe's Parliamentary
Assembly Sub-Committee on Human Rights meeting, where Mr. Vivien ar-
gued that it was necessary to abandon the label of "new religious move-
ments" and instead refer to unacceptable groups as "coercive sectarian
groups" or "criminal coercive sects" in order to clearly identify the totalitar-
46. See id.
47. The Observatory on Cults issued its first report in June 1998. Although the report
conceded the impossibility of defining the word "cult," the report implied that a cult is simply
any religious group listed in the Parliamentary Commission's 1996 report. Additionally, while
there were no recourses for an organization to be removed from the Parliamentary Commis-
sion's report, the Observatory of Cults had full discretion to add new movements to the list.
Additional recommendations included: advising the Ministry of Education to prevent cults
from infiltrating school by regulating any teachers who are members of a cult, instructing the
Ministry of Finances to have the Revenue Service regulate the enumerated cults, ordering the
National Order of Medical Doctors fight doctors who are "cultists," instructing notaries public
to be cautious in entering deeds involving cults, educating judges as to the evil of cults, and
instructing sport and youth groups about the danger of cults. The report not only requested
increased taxpayer money be assigned to fight against cults, but also suggested that anti-cult
movements be granted legal standing to initiate civil actions against cults and, thus, be permit-
ted to collect monetary damages. See Massimo Introvigne, The French Observatory's First
Yearly Report on Cults: A Disturbing Document (visited Feb. 21, 1999)
<http://www.cesnur.org/Observatory.htm>; see also U.S. Dept. of State, supra note 10.
48. See Establishing an Inter-Ministerial Mission to Fight Against Sects, Decree No.
98.890, Oct. 7, 1998 (visited Feb. 21 ,1999) <http:www.cesnur.org/decree98.htm>; see also
U.S. Dept. of State, supra note 10.
49. See U.S. Dept. of State, supra note 10.
50. Establishing an Inter-Ministerial Mission to Fight Against Sects, supra note 48.
51. See id.
52. Anti-Cult Hysteria in France: President of Anti-Cult Mission Attacks First Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution (visited Jan. 22, 1999) <http://www.cesnur.org/vivien.htm >.
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ian elements to be combated. 3 Due to the negative portrayal of the enumer-
ated 172 religious groups, both by the government sponsored Inter-
ministerial Mission to Fight Against Sects and the popular media, scholars
have observed that this excessive government intervention in the public dis-
cussion on religious beliefs has permitted the French government to adopt
the role of religious arbitrator and promote government-sponsored intoler-
ance.
54
B. Impact of the French Parliamentary Commission's Report
As a result of the Commission's report, the enumerated religious groups
have been marginalized and stigmatized by government officials." Members
of the religious groups listed in the report have been denied building permits
to construct places of worship and the ability to rent public meetings halls.
For example, in Lyon (France), municipal authorities refused to rent city fa-
cilities to Jehovah's Witnesses although the religious group had been meet-
ing at that particular location for more than twenty years. 6
Others have faced the loss of their employment specifically due to their
religious beliefs. 7 The French Department of Social Welfare refused to re-
new employment contracts with "childminders" (day care specialists) who
are Jehovah's Witnesses because, in their opinion, the "adherence to the faith
of Jehovah's Witnesses does not ... guarantee the safety, the morality, and
the conditions of education of the children in their care.""8 This stigma has
also extended to custody determinations in divorce proceedings. In eleven
separate cases, child custody was denied on the sole basis that the mothers
were Jehovah's Witnesses, a suspect religious organization.59 This climate of
intolerance has intensified due to negative media coverage.' During the past
three years, the popular media has consistently portrayed Jehovah's Wit-
nesses as a religion that breaks up families and whose members have a
higher rate of suicide and mental health problems than the general French
population.6
More recently, the French government has begun to rescind the tax-
53. Compass Direct, Global News from the Frontlines, Anti-Cult Movements Threaten
Religious Liberty in Europe: Anti-Cult Advocates Influence Council of Europe, Dec. 19, 1997
(visited Feb. 22, 1999) <http://www.jps.net/hIind/compass/n-971219.htm>.
54. See Laila AI-Marayati, Freedom of Thought, Conscience, Religion or Belief (visited
Feb. 21, 1999) <http://www.cesnur.org/USGovoct98.htm>.
55. See WAH, supra note 3 (manuscript at 24); see also International Helsinki Federation
for Human Rights, Annual Report 1999 on France (visited Nov. 5, 1999) <http://www.ihf-
hr.org/reports/ar99/ar99fra.htm>.
56. See McCabe & Fautrd, supra note 5, at 5 1.
57. See id.
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 11.
61. See id. at 50.
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exempt status of religious groups enumerated in the Commission's report."
The government justified these actions by insisting that French law provides
tax exemptions only to recognized religious corporations.' Since the 172
groups listed in the Parliamentary Report are categorized as "cults" and not
"religions," the Minister of Finance has begun to reclassify these groups as
commercial enterprises disqualified from the religious tax exemption
status."
In 1998, the French government rescinded the tax-exempt status of Je-
hovah's Witnesses and imposed a special sixty percent tax on all offerings
donated to the Jehovah's Witnesses.' Additionally, the French government
has claimed the religious group owes back taxes and penalties of over fifty
million dollars, although an eighteen month government audit revealed no
irregularities or commercial activity committed by the group. ' Thus, even
though a number of French administrative courts have identified Jehovah's
Witnesses as a well-recognized religion exempt from habitation and property
taxes imposed on non-religious buildings, the French government continues
to assess penalties against the religious organization.' After assessing the
current situation, the International Helsinki Federation's 1998 report noted
that Jehovah's Witnesses "have been singled out for close scrutiny" and their
"fiscal management has been examined with an intensity that suggests har-
assment." '
Nevertheless, the detrimental effects of the French Parliamentary Report
have spread far beyond the French borders. Even among Western European
countries, scholars have noted an alarming "cross-border or trans-national
effect" resulting from the French Report. ' For example, although French
courts have acknowledged that the 1996 French report is not a legal docu-
ment, a recent court decision in Geneva (Switzerland) upheld an administra-
62. Currently, Jehovah's Witnesses and the French Evangelical Pentecostal Church of
Besanqon are the only two religions to have experienced the rescinding of their tax-exempt
status. Both these religions are among the 172 organizations/groups listed in the 1996 Parlia-
mentary Report. See id. at 9-10, 15. However, in June 18, 1999 the French National Assembly
released a report addressing the finances of the 172 religious groups identified in the 1996
Parliamentary Commission's report. See U.S. Dept. of State, Annual Report on International
Religious Freedom for 1999: France, (released by the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor), Sept. 9, 1999 (visited Nov. 3, 1999) <http://www.cesnur.org/testi/irf/
irf_france99.htm>.
63. See McCabe & Fautrd, supra note 5, at 9-10. The French law on manual donations
(comparable to the "gift tax" in the United States) or transfer tax, is generally applied only to
estates. The law dictates that any deed containing either a declaration by the donee or a judi-
cial acknowledgement of a manual donation is subject to a donation tax. Article 795 of this
law provides a tax exemption for donations made to religious corporations. See id. at 10.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 9-10.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, supra note 55.
69. McCabe & Fautr6, supra note 5, at 58.
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tive decision not to renew a license to operate a private security agency to a
Swiss citizen based solely on the fact that he is a member of the Aumist re-ligion and this religion is listed in the French report as a dangerous cult."0
The reliance on this report is also seen in numerous discriminatory adminis-
trative decisions based on the French list." Following the French trend to re-
classify and categorize religious groups, Belgium and Germany recently es-
tablished similar Parliamentary Commissions." Similarly, Austria passed
legislation restricting the registration process needed to obtain governmental
recognition of religious entities." Even more alarming is the rising anti-cult
attitude permeating Eastern European countries seeking admission into the
European Union.7" These Eastern European applicants to the European Un-
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. On March 13, 1996, the Belgium House of Representatives established the BelgiumParliamentary Commission "to elaborate a policy in view of combating illegal practices of the
sects and the dangers they represent for the society and for individuals." WAH, supra note 3(manuscript at 7). As a result, the Belgium Commission issued a 670 paged report identifying189 "sects" and recommending the creation of two governmental entities to continue monitor-ing the enumerated "sects." See id. (manuscript at 15). Similarly, the German Commission,
assembled on June 12, 1996, conducted investigatory hearings and produced a 1998 report
recommending modifications in association and tax laws as a means of controlling religious
and non-profit associations. See id. (manuscript at 7, 16); Davis, supra note 16, at 754.
73. The original 1874 Austrian "Law on Recognition" of churches recognized 13 Aus-trian religious organizations. These recognized religions were automatically granted exemp-
tion from property taxes, entitlement to state-collected church taxes, the right to engage in
religious education, and immunity from securing work or residence permits for foreign reli-gious workers acting as ministers, missionaries, or teachers. Under the 1874 law, in order to
apply to receive the "recognized" status, the Government determined whether the applicant
religious organization met certain religious criteria, operated in full compliance with the Aus-
trian legal code, and did not practice or preach ideas contrary to accepted social customs. Dueto the long delays related to applying under the 1874 law, in December 1996 the Austrian Par-liament passed a new law allowing non-recognized religions to seek official status as confes-
sional communities. The new law requires additional criteria, such as having a minimum of300 members and a 20 year observational period before status can be granted. Nevertheless,yet even when approved, applicants would still be without many of the benefits available to
the 1874 "recognized" religions. Not only has the constitutionality of this new Austrian law
come under question, but experts argue that the law formalizes a "second-class status" for
non-recognized groups. See U.S. Dept. of State, Austria Report on Human Rights Practicesfor 1998 (released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor), Feb. 26, 1999(visited Aug. 18, 1999) <http://www.state.gov/www/global /hu... ights/ 1998 _'rp-report/austria.html>; see also Christopher J. Miner, Comment, Losing My Religion: Austria's NewReligion Law in Light of International and European Standards of Religious Freedom, 1998
BYU L. REv. 607 (1998).
74. For example, although Article 14 of the Russian Constitution prohibits the establish-
ment of a state or compulsory religion, the new law "On Freedom of Conscience and Reli-gious Association," passed in September 1997, threatens to seriously limit the scope of reli-gious freedom. The Russian law creates a "symbolic ranking" by automatically recognizing
and granting "first tier" status to the Russian Orthodox Church, the Muslim religion and Juda-ism. All other religions wishing to obtain legal recognition must wait a minimum of 15 years
to receive legal status. During this waiting period, the applicant religious organization is rele-gated to a second-tiered status, devoid and precluded from any non-profit tax benefits, the
right to own property, the right to enter into contracts, and other legal processes vital to carry
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ion may soon challenge the imposed requirement of national respect for hu-
man rights. For example, the applicants could argue that other European
Union members are currently permitted to legally create two-tiered religious
systems which distinguish between religions and cults."
Thus, by re-classifying numerous religious organizations as "dangerous
cults," the French Parliamentary Commission on Cults has fostered and en-
couraged a spirit of intolerance and suspicion throughout the European Con-
tinent. Faced with this growing tide of religious intolerance, some persecuted
religious groups have begun to look at possible international remedies. Arti-
cle 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides one such vi-
able means of successfully redressing these constitutional violations.
II. ARTICLE 9 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
A. Historical Perspective
Faced with the atrocities committed in World War II, European coun-
tries eager to rebuild their ties to one another formed the Council of
Europe."6 The principle objective of the Council was to draft an accord pro-
moting the maintenance and increased recognition of human rights and fun-
damental freedoms between the various member states.77 As a result, in
1950, the Council of Europe ratified the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention)," in which the
creation of Article 9 figured prominently.79
out religious life. See Religious Intolerance in Europe Today: Hearing Before the Commis-
sion on Security and Cooperation in Europe, supra note 14, at 7, 9, 33-34 (statements by Dr.
Ekaterina Smyslova, Chief of the Legal Department, Institute of Religion and Law, Moscow
& W. Cole Durham Jr., Professor, Brigham Young University).
75. See McCabe & Fautr6, supra note 5, at 15.
76. See About the Council of Europe (visited Mar. 11, 1999) <http://www.coe.fr/eng/
present/about.htrn>; Statute of Council of Europe (visited Mar. 11, 1999) <http:Ilwww.
coe.fr/eng/legaltxdle.htm>. The Council of Europe was established in London on May 5,
1949, "to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and
realizing the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their eco-
nomic and social progress." Statute of Council of Europe, supra. Headquartered in Stras-
bourg, France, the Council of Europe is currently composed of 41 member states: Albania,
Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liech-
tenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
the "former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," Turkey, Ukraine, and United Kingdom. See
The 41 Member States of the Council of Europe (visited Oct. 22, 1999)
<http://www.coe.fr/eng/std/states.htm>.
77. See Convention for Protection of Human Rights, supra note 4.
78. See Historical Background, supra note 17. Although signed in 1950, the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms became effective in 1953. See id.
79. Article 9 safeguards religious freedom by guaranteeing freedom of thought, con-
science, and religion for all individuals within the member states. See Convention for Protec-
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Once the European Convention became effective in 1953, all state sig-
natories involved in the ratification became legally bound to abide by the
terms and conditions of the treaty.'0 The States must provide effective reme-
dies before a national authority and guarantee the rights and freedoms of
their individual citizens without discrimination on any ground." After ex-
hausting all domestic judicial remedies, individuals may file complaints al-
leging breaches of the European Convention against any of the forty-one 2
signatory states. 3 The power of the European Court of Human Rights to re-
view the judgments of domestic judiciaries and ensure that signatory states
take appropriate remedial action (i.e. changing national laws or paying com-
pensation for Convention violations) demonstrates the "democratic belief
that certain fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual should not be
subordinated to the power or narrow political convenience of the State.""
Prior to November 1998, individuals seeking to initiate judicial proceed-
ings in the European Court had to first file their complaints with the Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights (European Commission). 5 The Euro-
pean Commission would then evaluate and review the validity of each stated
claim. 6 If the European Commission deemed the claim admissible as a
violation of the European Convention, the European Commission would
refer the matter to the European Court of Human Rights.8 The Court had the
authority to reach a judgment and have it referred to the Committee of
Ministers for enforcement.8
In 1997, the procedure for initiating judicial proceedings changed." The
addition of new signatory states" increased the case load and prompted fur-
tion of Human Rights, supra note 4. The Irish delegate to the preparatory sessions of the 1949
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms noted that "[clivil
and religious freedom are but two of the fundamental rights of man... If the Council of
Europe achieves no other end than the guarantee of those two rights, it will have justified its
existence." Gunn, supra note 20, at 307 (quoting statement of Mr. Everett, Council of Europe,
1 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE 'TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES' 103-04 (The Hague 1975)).
80. See James T. Richardson, Minority Religions, Religious Freedom, and the New-Pan-
European Political and Judicial Institutions, 37 J. CHURCH & STATE 39, 42 (1995).
81. See Simeon J. Ling, Forty Years of European Jurisprudence on Religious Freedom:
The European Court of Human Rights Precedent 1 (Oct. 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Rutherford Institute).
82. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
83. See Richardson, supra note 80.
84. The European Convention on Human Rights (visited Feb. 25, 1999) <http//www.
dhdirhr.coe.fr/intro/eng/GENERALJECHR.HTM>.
85. See Richardson, supra note 80, at 42-43.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See Historical Background, supra note 17.
90. Notably, 18 of the 41 signatories were added after 1990: Albania, Andorra, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland,
Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, "the former Yugoslav Republic of Mace-
donia," and Ukraine. See The 41 Member States of the Council of Europe, supra note 76.
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ther delays in the court procedure.9 This prompted debate on the necessity
for reform and, as a result, the Council of Europe ratified Protocol No. 11,
which created a single full-time new European Court of Human Rights.'
Today, all applicants file their petitions directly with the European Court
which, in turn, determines the admissibility of a petition. 3
B. The Scope ofArticle 9
Although the European Convention includes several provisions that pro-
tect the various facets encompassing freedom of conscience,' Article 9 acts
as the single most important provision guaranteeing the freedom of con-
science, belief, and religion." Identified as one of the essential foundations
of a democratic society,96 Article 9 has been held to be "one of the most vital
elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their conception of
life ... [as well as] a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, skeptics and the
unconcerned."'97
Most notably, Article 9(1) describes and guarantees the freedom of
thought, conscience and religion as a right belonging to everyone." This
right includes the liberty to change one's religion or beliefs, practice one's
religion alone or in the community and manifest these beliefs in worship,
teaching, practice and observance." As such, the European Court has found
Article 9 to protect "the sphere of personal beliefs and religious creeds
[and] ... acts which are intimately linked to those attitudes, such as acts of
91. A survey conducted in 1995 revealed that the average case took five years to work its
way through the Convention procedure thereby creating an enormous backlog of cases. See
Richardson, supra note 80, at 43.
92. See Historical Background, supra note 17.
93. See id.
94. See Gunn, supra note 20, at 308-09. For example, Article 10 (Freedom of Expres-
sion), Article 11 (Freedom of Assembly and Association), and Article 14 (Prohibition of dis-
crimination). See id.
95. The full text of Article 9 of the European Convention reads as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief,
in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or belief shall be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Convention for Protection of Human Rights, supra note 4.
96. See Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17, 31.
97. Id.
98. See Convention for Protection of Human Rights, supra note 4.
99. See id.
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worship or devotion."1
Nevertheless, Article 9(2) delineates the circumstances in which a gov-
ernment may limit an individual's freedom to outwardly manifest religious
beliefs.' To be permitted, the government must prove that the restriction is
prescribed by law and considered necessary in a democratic society. In or-
der to be deemed "necessary," the restriction must further a legitimate aim
such as public safety, the protection of public order, health, morals, or the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 2 Thus, Article 9 establishes
a subtle distinction between the absolute freedom of religion and the mani-
festations of religion or beliefs, which may be regulated, subject to the enu-
merated conditions imposed in Article 9(2).03
C. Application ofArticle 9 Prior to 1993
In order to determine whether an Article 9 violation has occurred, the
European Court follows a two-step analysis." First, the Court evaluates
whether the challenged governmental action restricts a right of conscience
under Article 9(1). °  If no identifiable right of conscience is restricted, the
Court dismisses the application. Nevertheless, if a restriction is identified,
the Court then analyzes whether Article 9(2) permits the restriction."06
Despite these measures, the European Commission has accepted and
published very few Article 9 rights of conscience and religion claims. 7
Fewer claims have reached the European Court.' From 1955 to 1993, the
100. Ling, supra note 81, at 6-7 (quoting C. v. United Kingdom, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 147
(1983)). Despite seemingly clear and straightforward language, Article 9(1) has been subject
to intense interpretation and scholarly debate. Although Article 9 is generally understood to
protect the individual's absolute "right to thought, conscience, and religion," sometimes
known as forum internum, the extent to which Article 9 guarantees the right to externally dis-
play or act upon these beliefs is more narrowly construed. See P. VAN DUK & G.F.H. VAN
HOOF ET AL., THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 541-
54 (1998) (examining the application of Article 9(1)); see also Arrowsmith v. United King-
dom, App. No. 7050/75, 19 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 5 (1980) (holding that although the Peti-
tioner's pacifist beliefs fell "within the ambit of the right to freedom of thought and con-
science," the actual act of distributing anti-military leaflets to British troops was not a
"manifestation" of her beliefs because the leaflets contained arguments unrelated to her paci-
fist views).
101. See Gunn, supra note 20, at 309. Similar permissible governmental restrictions are
mentioned in Articles 7, 8, 10, and 11 of the European Convention. See id.
102. See Convention for Protection of Human Rights, supra note 4.
103. See W. Cole Durham, Jr., Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative
Framework, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 1,
29 (J.D. van der Vyver & J. Witte, Jr. eds., 1996).
104. As previously discussed, prior to the changes in November 1998, the European
Commission would also have applied this two-step analysis when reviewing applications to
the European Court. See Historical Background, supra note 17.
105. See Gunn, supra note 20, at 312-15.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 310.
108. See id.
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European Commission published only forty-five cases directly involving Ar-
ticle 9 challenges out of 20,000 claims submitted.'" Of the forty-five cases,"'
the Court determined that an Article 9 violation occurred only once, in Kok-
kinakis v. Greece."' Thus, Kokkinakis became the first case decided by the
European Court on the basis of Article 9. In only one additional case,
Manoussakis and Others v. Greece,"' has the Court found a breach of Arti-
cle 9. Therefore, religious minorities seeking to address the rising religious
intolerance in Europe should examine the reasoning and rationale provided
in Kokkinakis and Manoussakis in order to evaluate the potential success of a
future Article 9 challenge.
III. THE EUROPEAN COURT SPEAKS: AN ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE 9
KOKKINAKIS V. GREECE AND MANOUSSAKIS AND OTHERS V. GREECE
After over forty years of silence, in 1993, the European Court of Human
Rights spoke out in behalf of religious freedom in the seminal Article 9 case,
Kokkinakis v. Greece."' Since that time, in only one additional case, Ma-
noussakis and Others v. Greece,"4 has the European Court found a breach of
Article 9. Taken in conjunction, an analysis of Kokkinakis and Manoussakis
provides useful insight into the substantive tests applied by the European
Court to determine Article 9 violations, as well as the potential viability of a
present day Article 9 claim to curtail the rising religious intolerance in
Europe.
109. See id. at 309-10. Researcher T. Jeremy Gunn, from the National Committee for
Public Education and Religious Liberty, was unable to ascertain what percentage of the
20,000 applications raised rights of conscience (Article 9) claims. From this analysis, Gunn
concluded, the "European Court has too often treated rights of conscience as an awkward in-
convenience to be tolerated rather than as a matter of fundamental importance." Id. at 308.
110. Of the 45 cases, only five cases proceeded beyond the initial procedures: Kamell
and Hardt v. Sweden, App. No. 4733/71, 14 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 676 (Eur. Comm'n)
(1971); Darby Case, 187 Eur. Ct. H.R. (set. A) (1990); Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1993); Hoffman v. Austria, 255-C Eur. Ct. H.R. 68 (ser. A) (1993) (Eur.
Comm'n); Grandrath v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 2299/64, 10 Y.B. Eur. Conv.
on H.R. 626 (Comm. Ministers) (1967). See Gunn, supra note 20, at 310; Historical Back-
ground, supra note 17 (describing the application procedure). Of those five cases, three re-
sulted in findings that Article 9 violations did not occur. In Karnell and Hardt v. Sweden, a
successful negotiation between the parties precluded the need for any further judicial proceed-
ings. In Grandrath v. Federal Republic of Germany, the Commission found there was no vio-
lation of any article of the Convention. In Hoffmann v. Austria, both the Commission and the
Court found only an Article 8 violation. See Gunn, supra note 20, at 310. However, the Court
found that only one of the two remaining cases that it reviewed constituted an actual Article 9
violation. The Article 9 violation was found in Kokkinakis, whereas in Darby, the Court found
the church tax to have violated the petitioner's rights under Article 14 (right to equal treat-
ment). See id.
111. 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
112. 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1996).
113. 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
114. 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1996).
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A. Kokkinakis v. Greece
As the first case in which the European Court of Human Rights identi-
fied an Article 9 violation, Kokkinakis v. Greece,"' provides perception into
the factual circumstances that may give rise to an Article 9 violation as well
as the limitations that a state may impose on the rights of conscience under
the European Convention." 6
The Kokkinakis case involved an elderly Jehovah's Witness couple, Mi-
nos and Elissavet Kokkinakis, who visited the wife of the cantor of the local
Greek Orthodox church in Sitia, Crete."' The cantor's wife invited Mr. and
Mrs. Kokkinakis into her home and listened to their religious beliefs and ci-
tations from Bible passages. The cantor, upon hearing of the visit, promptly
called the police and asked that the Kokkinakises be arrested and prosecuted
under the Greek anti-proselytism law." 8 After dismissing the defendants' ob-
115. 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18.
116. See Gunn, supra note 20, at 318.
117. See Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8, 1 7.
118. See id. at 8, 8. Religious proselytism is prohibited under both the Greek Constitu-
tion and Greek criminal law. The 1975 Greek Constitution establishes the Greek Orthodox
Church as the "dominant religion in Greece" (Article 3), while also guaranteeing freedom of
religion (Article 13) subject to a prohibition against proselytism:
Freedom of conscience in religious matters is inviolable. The enjoyment of per-
sonal and political rights shall not depend on an individual's religious beliefs.
There shall be freedom to practice any known religion; individuals shall be free to
perform their rites of worship without hindrance and under the protection of the
law. The performance of rites of worship must not prejudice public order or public
morals. Proselytism is prohibited.
Id. at 11, 13 (translation of art. 13, 1-2 of the Greek Const.). Proselytism was first made
a criminal offense in 1938 during the rule of the Greek dictator Metaxas by section 4 of Law
no. 1363/1938. A year later, this law was expanded in section 2 of Law no. 1672/1939, pro-
viding:
1. Anyone engaging in proselytism shall be liable to imprisonment and a fine of
between 1,000 and 50,000 drachmas; he shall, moreover, be subject to police su-
pervision for a period of between six months and one year to be fixed by the court
when convicting the offender. The term of imprisonment may not be commuted to
a fine.
2. By "proselytism" is meant, in particular, any direct or indirect attempt to in-
trude on the religious beliefs of a person of a different religious persuasion (etero-
doxos), with the aim of undermining those beliefs, either by any kind of induce-
ment or promise of an inducement or moral support or material assistance, or by
fraudulent means or by taking advantage of his inexperience, trust, need, low intel-
lect or na'vety.
3. The commission of such an offense in a school or other educational establish-
ment or a philanthropic institution shall constitute a particularly aggravating cir-
cumstance.
Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12, 1 16. (translation of Greek Law No. 1672/1939,
§ 4). Notably, Minos Kokkinakis, the applicant in the 1993 Kokkinakis v. Greece case, was
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jection that the anti-proselytism law was unconstitutional, the Lasithi Crimi-
nal Court found Mr. and Mrs. Kokkinakis guilty of proselytism and sen-
tenced them each to four months imprisonment, imposed a fine of 10,000
drachmas, and ordered the destruction of their religious booklets."9
On appeal, the Crete Court of Appeal quashed Mrs. Kokkinakis's con-
viction due to a lack of evidence that she had attempted to proselytize Mrs.
Kyriakaki."2° However, the Court of Appeal upheld Mr. Kokkinakis's con-
viction, but reduced his sentence to three months imprisonment, on the basis
that he had taken advantage of Mrs. Kyriakaki's "inexperience, her low
intellect and her na'vety" in order to undermine her religious beliefs.' Al-
though Mr. Kokkinakis again appealed, challenging the constitutionality of
the anti-proselytism law, the Court of Cassation rejected his plea and dis-
missed the appeal.'22
Thus, having exhausted all remedies under Greek law, in 1988 Mr.
Kokkinakis applied for relief to the European Commission for Human
Rights.'23 Finding Mr. Kokkinakis's application to be admissible, the Com-
mission unanimously found that his rights under Article 9 of the European
Convention had been violated and referred the case to the European Court. 2"
There, by a vote of six to three, the Court found that the anti-proselytism
law, as applied to Mr. Kokkinakis, interfered with his freedom to manifest
his beliefs and raised an Article 9 violation.' As a result, the Court awarded
Mr. Kokkinakis $1700 for his non-pecuniary damages and $12,000 for
costs and expenses.' 7
also the first Jehovah's Witness to be convicted under the 1938 law. Between 1938 and 1986,
Mr. Kokkinakis was arrested more than 60 times for proselytism and, as a result, imprisoned
for more than five and a half years. See id. at 8, 1 6; Gunn, supra note 20, at 319-21.
119. See Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8-9, 9.
120. Seeid. at9, 10.
121. Id. Interestingly, the dissent in both the Crete Court of Appeals and the Court of
Cassation argued that Mr. Kokkinakis's conviction should be quashed because there was no
evidence to indicate that Mrs. Kyriakaki, a cantor's wife, "was particularly inexperienced in
Orthodox doctrine" and, as such, there was insufficient proof to fulfill one of the elements of
the anti-proselytism crime. Id.
122. See id. at 10,91 12.
123. See id. at 15, 125.
124. See id. at 15-16, 26. Mr. Kokkinakis originally applied to the Commission claim-
ing that his conviction for proselytism was in breach of his rights as secured in Article 7, 9,
and 10 as well as those delineated in Article 5 1 and Article 6 I 1, 2. When declaring the
Kokkinakis application admissible on Dec. 7, 1990, the Commission excluded the arguments
based on Articles 5 and 6, as ill-founded. Although the Commission, on Dec. 3, 1991, unani-
mously held that there had been a violation of Article 9, no violations were found under Arti-
cles 7 or 10. See id.
125. See id. at 22, 50.
126. See id. at 18, 1 59-60. A total of 400,000 Greek drachmas or approximately $1700
U.S. at the 1993 exchange rate. See Gunn, supra note 20, at 321.
127. See Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23, 1 59, 60. A total of 2,789,500
Greek drachmas or approximately $12,000 U.S. at the 1993 exchange rate. See Gunn, supra
note 20, at 321.
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Unlike previous cases, 28 the European Court immediately held that Mr.
Kokkinakis's conviction constituted an interference with his "freedom to
manifest [his] religion" as delineated in Article 9(1).29 Next, the Court un-
dertook a three-part inquiry to determine whether Article 9(2) permitted such
an interference.'3° First, the Court examined whether the proselytism for
which Mr. Kokkinakis was punished was in fact "prescribed by law, ,,13
thereby providing sufficient notice that the activity was prohibited.32 Sec-
ond, the Court assessed whether the Greek government had a "legitimate
aim" in restricting this activity.' 3 Finally, the Court determined whether the
restriction, namely, the Greek anti-proselytism law, was of a type that is
"necessary in a democratic society. ""
1. "Prescribed by Law"
The Court began by analyzing whether, as "prescribed by law," there
was sufficient notice that proselytism was prohibited.' Rejecting the appli-
cant's argument that the lack of objective criteria created an unduly vague
law containing "'extendible, catch-all' expressions... designed to ensure
that non-Orthodox Christians were permanently gagged,"''36 the Court instead
found that the wealth of national case law defining "proselytism" as well as
the need to keep pace with changing circumstances precluded the necessity
for a more precise statute. 3' The dissent disagreed, arguing instead that since
the prosecution was able to successfully prosecute Mr. Kokkinakis despite
the failure to prove one of the elements of the crime,' 38 the law failed to give
128. Prior to Kokkinakis, in order to determine the existence of an Article 9(1) interfer-
ence, the European Court would first have analyzed whether the applicants' questioned activ-
ity (i.e. the Kokkinakis's proselytizing) was a religiously motivated action (within the forum
externum) or a manifestation of a belief (within the forum internum). See Gunn, supra note
20, at 322.
129. See Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18,1 36.
130. See id. Prior to Kokkinakis, the Court had previously delineated this three-step in-
quiry in an Article 10(2) freedom of expression case involving obscenity. See Gunn, supra
note 20, at 322 n.83 (citing Miller and Others, 133 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20-23, [ 29-37
(1988)).
131. See Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18, 137.
132. See Gunn, supra note 20, at 322.
133. See Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20, 42. According to Article 9(2),
these "legitimate aims" include: "the interests of public safety," "the protection of public or-
der, health, or morals," and "the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." Convention
for Protection of Human Rights, supra note 4.
134. See Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20, 1 45.
135. See id. at 18, 137.
136. Id. at 19,138.
137. See id. at 19, 140.
138. One of the elements of Greek Law no. 1363/1938, § 4 (amended by Law no.
1672/1939, § 2) prohibiting proselytism, is defined as the undermining of another's religious
beliefs "by taking advantage of his inexperience, trust, need, low intellect or nafvety." The
fact that the cantor's wife herself testified that her discussion with the Kokkinakises did not
1999]
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proper notice of what was actually prohibited and thus was not adequately
"prescribed by law."'39
2. "Legitimate Aim"
Next, the Court considered whether the anti-proselytism law advanced a
"legitimate aim" as delineated under Article 9(2)."4 The. applicant argued
that "religion was part of the 'constantly renewable flow of human thought'
and to exclude this topic from public debate would result in a 'strange soci-
ety of silent animals that [would] think but.., not express themselves, that
[would] talk but ... not communicate, and that [would] exist but... not co-
exist. '"""' Nevertheless, the Court accepted, without elaboration, the Greek
government's rationale that the anti-proselytism law had been established for
the "legitimate aim" of protecting the rights and freedoms of its citizens
from "attempts to influence them by immoral and deceitful means."' 2
3. "Necessary in a Democratic Society"
Finally, the Court examined whether the restriction was of a type that is
"necessary in a democratic society."'" 3 Under this prong of the three-part test,
influence her beliefs and that she was the wife of a religious leader in the community, sup-
ports the argument that this element was not proven. See Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at 10, 10; see also Gunn, supra note 20, at 324. Regarding the determination of this ele-
ment, Judge Pettiti observed that the law gave the government the right to assess the alleged
victim's weakness in order to punish a proselytizer. Judge Pettiti argued that this element
constituted "an interference that could become dangerous if resorted to by an authoritarian
State." Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (Pettiti, J., partly concurring).
139. See Gunn, supra note 20, at 324. Judge Pettiti's partly concurring opinion ques-
tioned the very legality of the Greek law in that "the haziness of the definition [of prosely-
tism] leaves too wide a margin of interpretation for determining criminal penalties." Kokkin-
nakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (Pettiti, J., partly concurring). Discussing the validity of
such laws, Judge Pettiti argued the following:
Proselytism is linked to freedom of religion; a believer must be able to communi-
cate his faith and his beliefs in the religious sphere as in the philosophical sphere.
Freedom of religion and conscience is a fundamental right and this freedom must
be able to be exercised for the benefit of all religions and not for the benefit of a
single Church, even if this has traditionally been the established Church or 'domi-
nant religion'
Id. Furthermore, Judge Pettiti perceived that "the only limits on the exercise of this right
[should be]... where there is an attempt to coerce the person into consenting or to use ma-
nipulative techniques." Id. Even in such cases, this action "must be punished in positive law
as ordinary criminal offenses. Proselytism cannot be forbidden under cover of punishing such
activities [... 1 because attempting to make converts is not in itself an attack on the freedom
and beliefs of others or an infringement of their rights." Id.
140. See Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20, 1 42.
141. Id. at20, 43.
142. Id. at 20, In 42, 44.
143. See id. at 20, 45.
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the Court attempts to determine whether the measures taken at the national
level are justified in principle and proportionate to the perceived danger. In
effect, the Court balances the need to protect the rights and liberties of the
general population against the conduct for which the applicant stands ac-
cused. In doing so, the Court strives to look at the impugned judicial deci-
sion against the background of the case as a whole.'"
Applying this method, the Court in Kokkinakis determined that although
a government may distinguish between bearing Christian witness and im-
proper proselytism," in this instance, the Greek courts had not sufficiently
specified in what way the accused had attempted to convince his neighbor by
improper means.'" As the Greek government had not shown that Mr. Kokki-
nakis's conviction was justified by a pressing social need, and that addition-
ally, the contested measure did not appear to have been proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued, the Court found that there was a breach of Article 9
of the European Convention.4 '
4. Analysis
As the first case to have identified an Article 9 violation in the forty
years of the European Court's existence, the Kokkinakis decision is clearly
of great importance. Some have suggested that the European Court's deci-
sion signals the beginning of a more expansive judicial interpretation of the
rights of conscience. 48 Nevertheless, the lack of delineated rationale accom-
panying the Kokkinakis decision suggests that the European Court has con-
tinued to treat rights of conscience as "an awkward inconvenience to be tol-
erated rather than as a matter of fundamental importance."'4 9 As such, three
recurring weaknesses can be identified. '" First, the Kokkinakis case indicates
that the European Court has failed to require governments to impose less re-
strictive burdens on issues of conscience.'' For example, instead of finding
the Greek anti-proselytism law to be per se in violation of Article 9,52 the
144. See id. at21, 47.
145. See id. at 21, 48. The European Court based its distinction between "Christian
witness" and "improper proselytism," on the 1956 World Council of Churches report which
defined "true evangelism" "as an essential mission and a responsibility of every Christian and
every Church." Id. This same report defined "improper proselytism" as a corrupted form of
true evangelism which may take the form of offering material or social advantages with a
view of gaining new members or exerting improper pressure on people by the use of violence
or brainwashing. See id.
146. See id. at21, 49.
147. See id. at 21-22, 49-50.
148. See Gunn, supra note 20, at 315.
149. Id. at 308.
150. See id. at 325.
151. See id.
152. Judge Pettiti, in his partly concurring opinion, argued that "the current criminal leg-
islation in Greece on proselytism was in itself contrary to Article 9." Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (Pettiti, J., partly concurring). Likewise, authors van Dijk and van Hoof
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Kokkinakis Court based the Article 9 violation on the fact that the Greek
courts had not sufficiently proven all the elements of the anti-proselytism
crime of which Mr. Kokkinakis stood accused.5 3 The Court's opinion sug-
gests that Mr. Kokkinakis still could have been properly arrested, prose-
cuted, convicted, fined and jailed for his fifteen minute conversation with the
cantor's wife under the current anti-proselytism law."' Thus, instead of re-
quiring governments to follow the least restrictive means when limiting the
exercise of the fundamental right of freedom of conscience, Kokkinakis sug-
gests that the European Court is willing to accept any rationale provided by
the government to support the restriction.'
Additionally, the Kokkinakis decision suggests a bias against non-
mainstream religions." Until the Kokkinakis case, all applications to the
European Commission from religions that could be labeled "new," "minor-
ity," or "nontraditional" were denied. Furthermore, even in Kokkinakis
when examining whether the anti-proselytism law was "justified in princi-
ple," the Court held that a distinction could be made between bearing Chris-
tian witness and improper proselytism.' Thus, the Court implies that separa-
tion exists between acceptable Christian witness and other forms of
unacceptable proselytism."5 9 Finally, this distinction suggests the European
Court's continued deference to state-established religions and general un-
willingness to analyze laws that benefit religions favored by the State." ° This
contention is supported by the European Commission's opinion that "a State
Church system cannot in itself be considered to violate Article 9 of the Con-
vention [because] such a system ... existed there [in the Contracting State]
already when the Convention was drafted and when they became parties to
it."' 6 Thus, although Kokkinakis carries the distinction of being the first
European Court case to have found a breach of Article 9, the lack of analysis
observe that "[i]n concentrating on the application of the legislation the Court sidestepped the
issue of whether the legislation as such constituted a breach of Article 9." VAN DUK & VAN
HOOF ET AL., supra note 100, at 541-54.
153. See Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21, 1 49.
154. See Gunn, supra note 20, at 325.
155. See id. at 325-27.
156. See id. at 327.
157. See id. at 311. Although Hoffrmann v. Austria involved a religious minority group,
the case was decided on Article 9 grounds by the European Commission, not the European
Court. See Hoffmann v. Austria, 225-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
158. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
159. See Gunn, supra note 20, at 328. Further evidence of a bias towards religious
minority groups is found Judge Valticos dissenting opinion. In his dissent, Judge Valticos de-
scribes "proselytism" as the "rape of the beliefs of others," and characterizes the 77 year old
Mr. Kokkinakis as a "militant Jehovah's Witness, a hardbitten adept of proselytism, a special-
ist in conversion... [who] swoops on [the cantor's wife]." Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. at
31 (Valticos, J., dissenting).
160. See Gunn, supra note 20, at 329.
161. Darby Case, 187 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17, 45 (1990); see also Gunn, supra
note 20, at 329.
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indicates the failure of the Court to consider the rights of conscience as mat-
ters of fundamental importance. 62
B. Manoussakis and Others v. Greece
Since the Kokkinakis decision, in only one other case has the European
Court identified an Article 9 violation.6 3 In Manoussakis, the applicants peti-
tioned the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs to grant authorization
to use a rented room as a place of worship "for all kinds of meetings, wed-
dings, etc. of Jehovah's Witnesses."'" Despite a three year delay, the Minis-
ter of Education and Religious Affairs continued to withhold issuance of the
permit on the basis that it had not received all the necessary information
from the other government departments involved." Meanwhile, the Herak-
lion public prosecutor's office, instigated by the local Ghazi Orthodox Parish
Church, commenced criminal proceedings against the applicants for having
"established and operated a place of worship for religious meetings... with-
out the authorization from the recognized ecclesiastical authorities and the
Minister of Education and Religious Affairs."'"
162. See Gunn, supra note 20, at 306.
163. See Manoussakis and Others v. Greece, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1996).
164. Id. at 1351, 17.
165. See id. at 1351-52, 11.
166. Id. at 1352, 1 12. Greek Law no. 1363/1938 § 1 (as amended by Law no.
1672/1939) required all religious denominations, with the exception of the State sanctioned
Greek Orthodox Church, apply to the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs for authori-
zation. The Minister, in turn, would evaluate whether there were "essential reasons" warrant-
ing the authorization to build or operate a place of worship:
The construction and operation of temples of any denomination whatsoever shall
be subject to authorization by the recognized ecclesiastical authority and the Min-
istry of Education and Religious Affairs. This authorization shall be granted on the
terms and conditions specified by royal decree to be adopted on a proposal by the
Minister of Education and Religious Affairs.
As of publication of the royal decree referred to in the preceding paragraph, tem-
ples or other places of worship which are set up or operated without complying
with the decree.., shall be closed and placed under seal by the police and use
thereof shall be prohibited; persons who have set up or operated such places of
worship shall be fined 50,000 drachmas and sentenced to a non-convertible term of
between two and six months' imprisonment.
Id. at 1354, 1 21 (quoting Greek Law no. 1363/1938, § I (as amended by Law no.
1672/1939)). The Royal Decree of 20 May/2 June 1939 § 1 (3) delineates the process by
which applicants request authorization to build or operate a place of worship. Interestingly
enough, the State sanctioned Greek Orthodox Church is exempt from this application process:
1. To obtain an authorization for the construction or operation of temples not sub-
ject to the legislation on temples and priests of parishes belonging to the Greek Or-
thodox Church, within the meaning of Section 1 of Law no. 1672/1939, the follow-
ing steps must be completed:
(a) An application shall be submitted by at least fifty families, for more or
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The Heraklion Criminal Court acquitted the applicants on the ground
that "in the absence of any act of proselytism, followers of any faith are free
to meet even if they do not have the requisite authorization." '67 On appeal by
the Heraklion prosecution, the court reversed the original decision and sen-
tenced each of the applicants to three months imprisonment and fined them
each 20,000 drachmas.' The applicants appealed to the Court of Cassation
arguing that the requirements to register a place of worship were contrary to
the Greek Constitution"s and Article 9 and 11 of the European Convention. 7'
The Court of Cassation dismissed their appeal on the grounds that the
regulatory duties of the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs did not
violate the free exercise of religion as these duties were in place merely to
ensure that the statutory conditions to grant authorization were met. 7'
The applicants subsequently applied to the European Commission'72 and
their petition was deemed admissible. Soon after, the Commission unani-
mously expressed the opinion that there had been a breach of Article 9 and
referred the case to the European Court.' Dismissing the Greek govern-
ment's contention that the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic reme-
dies,74 the Court proceeded to identify an interference with the exercise of
less the same neighborhood and living in an area at a great distance from a
temple of the same denomination, it being assumed that the distance makes it
difficult for them to observe their religious duties. The requirement of fifty
families shall not apply to suburbs or villages.
(b) The application shall be addressed to the local ecclesiastical authorities
and must be signed by the heads of the families, who shall indicate their ad-
dresses. The authenticity of their signatures shall be certified by the local po-
lice authority, which following an inquiry on the ground shall attest that the
conditions referred to in the preceding sub-paragraph are satisfied.
(c) The local police authority shall issue a reasoned opinion on the applica-
tion. It shall then transmit the application, with its opinion, to the Ministry of
Education and Religious Affairs, which may accept or reject the application
according to whether it considers that the construction or use of a new temple
is justified or whether the provisions of the present decree have been com-
plied with.
Id. at 1355, 23 (citing the Royal Decree of 20 May/2 June 1939, § 1).
167. Id. at 1352,1 13.
168. See id. at 1352, 15. Approximately $100 U.S. at the 1996 exchange rate. See id.
169. GREEK CONST. Pt. I1 (Individual and Social Rights), art. 13, §§ 1-5.
170. See Convention for Protection of Human Rights, supra note 4.
171. See Manoussakis, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1353, 17.
172. Applicants alleged violations of Articles 3 and 5, Article 6 taken together with Arti-
cle 14, as well as Articles 8, 9, 10, and II and Article I of Protocol No. I. The application
was declared admissible based solely on Article 9. See Manoussakis, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
at 1358, U 28-29.
173. See id. at 1358, 29.
174. See id. at 1358-60, R 31-33. The Court rejected the Government's argument that
the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies on the basis that the applicants' appli-
cation for authorization for a place of worship had been "left in a state of uncertainty" for
over 16 years. The Court additionally noted that "the authorities did not in practice always
24
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freedom to manifest religion under Article 9(1). As such, the European
Court set about analyzing this interference under the three-prong test set
forth in Kokkinakis.'15
1. "Prescribed by Law"
The applicants challenged the substantive provisions of the Greek law
as not adequately "prescribed by law" because of the "general and perma-
nent prohibition on the establishment of a church or a place of worship of
any religion other than the Orthodox religion."' 76 As this legal prohibition
could only be lifted once reviewed and authorized by the Minister of Educa-
tion and Religious Affairs, the applicants argued that this lengthy process
constituted an impediment to freedom of religion because it permitted a wide
range of discretionary abuse due to the lack of affirmative conditions of re-
view and the time constraints imposed.' 7 Despite these arguments, the Court
did not rule on whether the interference was "prescribed by law,"'' 78 but
merely indicated that "in any event, it [the Greek law] was incompatible
with Article 9 of the Convention on other grounds."'79
2. "Legitimate Aim"
Next, the government contended that the challenged law served the "le-
gitimate aim" of fostering public order and the rights and freedoms of oth-
ers."8 National support for the Greek Orthodox Church, the government al-
leged, promoted "public order" since the Church had kept alive the national
conscience and Greek patriotism during periods of foreign occupation. '8
Additionally, the government argued that to maintain public order it was
necessary to protect its citizens from various sects manifesting their ideas
through "unlawful and dishonest" means.'82
Although the Court recognized that individual States are permitted to
comply with the decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court." Id. at 1360, 1 33.
175. 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18, 1 36.
176. Manoussakis, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1361,1 37.
177. See id. at 1361-62, 37, 38.
178. See id. at 1362, 9 37-38. In his concurring opinion, Judge Martens argued that the
case would have been best decided on the basis of the "prescribed by law" prong, as the ap-
plicants' complaint was one of general, not individual, injustice (i.e., the general obstruction
to obtaining authorization for a place of worship for Jehovah's Witnesses). Judge Martens
suggested that this approach is compatible with the Court's general belief that the "prescribed
by law" analysis should include an assessment of the quality of the law invoked as a justifica-
tion for the interference in question. As such, Judge Martens would find the Greek law (no.
1363/1938) to be per se incompatible with Article 9. See id. at 1369, 1-3 (Martens, J., con-
curring).
179. Id. at 1362, 38.
180. See id. at 1362, 139.
181. See id.
182. See id.
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verify whether a particular organization is carrying on harmful activities un-
der the guise of pursuing religious aims, it also noted that Jehovah's Wit-
nesses had already been defined as a "known religion" under Greek law."3
Nevertheless, the Court concluded with no further analysis that the chal-
lenged law pursued the "legitimate aim" of promoting public order.'
3. "Necessary in a Democratic Society"
In determining whether the challenged law is "necessary in a democratic
society," the Court first analyzed whether the measures taken at the national
level were justified in principle, and second, whether the restriction imposed
was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued pursuant to Article 9(2).'"
Due to the blatant restrictions imposed on freedom of religion, the Court in-
dicated that the Greek law called for "very strict scrutiny by the Court.""'
When examining whether the Greek law was justified in principle, the
Court noted that these measures "allow[ed] far-reaching interference by the
political, administrative and ecclesiastical authorities with the exercise of re-
ligious freedom," due to the virtually unfettered discretion conferred upon
government officials.'87 Despite the contention that the Minister of Education
and Religious Affairs was under a strict duty to grant authorization once the
three conditions in Article 13 of the Greek Constitutional were satisfied,'88
the Court noted that the Minister's discretionary ability to defer his reply in-
definitely 89 or refuse his authorization without further explanation indicated
otherwise. As such, the Court dictated that the Greek law was consistent
with Article 9 only in so far as it permitted the Minister to verify whether the
183. See id. at 1362, 1 40. By distinguishing "movements... [conducting] activities
which are harmful to the population" from "known religions," such as Jehovah's Witnesses,
the Court implicitly suggests that a government may be permitted to give preferential treat-
ment to State-recognized religions. Id.
184. See id. Judge Martens, in his concurring opinion, observed that when a State-
sanctioned religion exists, "public order arguments may easily disguise intolerance." Id. at
1369, 1 6 (Martens, J., concurring).
185. Seeid. at 1364, 144.
186. Id. The concurring opinion by Judge Martens observed that "the substance of the
,necessary in a democratic society' is a balancing exercise of the elements of the individual
case." Id. at 1369, 1 2 (Martens, J., concurring). Thus, it would appear that this prong bal-
ances the government's perceived need for the law against the impact that said law would
have on the applicant (the individual). See id.
187. Id. at 1364, 45.
188. See id. at 1365, 46. Article 13 required the following three conditions: the appli-
cant must be from a known religion, there must be no risk of prejudicing public order or pub-
lic morals, and there must be no danger of proselytism. See id. (citing the GREEK CONST. art.
13,912).
189. See id. at 1364, 145. For example, although Mr. Manoussakis and his companions
had applied for the Minister's authorization in March 1983, the Court noted that "to date [Au-
gust 1996] ... the applicants have not received an express decision." Id at 1366, 151. Thus,
the applicants had waited 13 years and still received no reply. See id.
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formal Constitutional conditions were satisfied.' Thus, the Court forcefully
held that "the right to freedom of religion as guaranteed under the Conven-
tion excludes any discretion on the part of the State to determine whether re-
ligious beliefs or the means used to express such are legitimate."""
When analyzing whether the restriction imposed is proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued pursuant to Article 9(2), the Court observed a "clear
tendency on the part of the administrative and ecclesiastical authorities to
use these provisions to restrict the activities of faiths outside the Orthodox
Church."'" As a result, the Court rejected the government's reliance on the
applicants' failure to comply with a legal formality as a basis for justifying
their conviction. The Court also found the degree of severity of the sanction
to be immaterial. 93
Thus, the Court unanimously found an Article 9 violation on the basis
that "the impugned conviction had such a direct effect on the applicants'
freedom of religion that it cannot be regarded as proportionate to the legiti-
mate aim pursued, nor, accordingly, as necessary in a democratic society.' 94
4. Analysis
The Manoussakis decision provides some optimism as to the Court's
growing willingness to analyze cases alleging Article 9 violations. Unlike
the divided Kokkinakis decision,'95 the Manoussakis Court unanimously
found a breach of Article 9.96 The inclusion of detailed rationale guiding the
reader through the Court's analysis of the parties' arguments also suggests
an increasing awareness by the Court of the need to define the scope of Arti-
cle 9 for future petitioners.
Despite the unanimous decision, the Manoussakis decision reflects the
European Court's continued deference to state-established religions. As in
Kokkinakis, the Manoussakis Court declined to find the Greek registration
law to be per se in violation of Article 9, notwithstanding the "clear ten-
dency on the part of the administrative and ecclesiastical authorities to use
these provisions to restrict the activities of faiths outside the Orthodox
190. See id. at 1365, 1 47. The concurring opinion of Judge Martens advocated the stance
that the "prior authorization" requirement to open places of worship should in no way "enable
authorities to evaluate the tenets of the applicant community," rather "authorization should
always be given, unless very exceptional, objective and insuperable grounds of public order
make that impossible." Id. at 1369, 6.
191. id. at 1365,1 47.
192. Id. at 1365,1 48.
193. See id. at 1366, 52.
194. Id. at 1366, 53. The Court awarded 4,030,100 drachmas (approximately $17,000
U.S. at the 1996 exchange rate). See id.
195. See Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24. The Court in Kokkinakis found an
Article 9 violation by a vote of six to three. See id.
196. See Manoussakis, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1367.
1999]
27
Dunne: Addressing Religious Intolerance in Europe: The Limited Applicati
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1999
144 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30
Church."' 97 By upholding the Greek law, the European Court validated the
Greek constitutional provision requiring all religious groups, except for the
state sponsored Orthodox Church, to register their places of worship. This
rationale suggests that had the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs
more efficiently processed the place of worship applications for religious
minorities, the Greek government could validly waive this requirement for
the Greek Orthodox Church while continuing to demand that all other reli-
gious minorities duly register. Thus, instead of requiring governments to uni-
formly apply registration requirements, the Manoussakis decision reflects a
continued deference to state sponsored religions.
Despite the continued deference, the inclusion of detailed rationale has
permitted the rights encompassed in Article 9 to become more clearly de-
fined, thereby allowing future applicants greater opportunity to submit suc-
cessful claims to the European Court of Human Rights.
C. The Legacy of Kokkinakis and Manoussakis
As a result of the Kokkinakis and Manoussakis decisions, member states
charged with Article 9 violations have shown an increased willingness to
seek the conciliatory resolution delineated in Article 38 of the European
Convention.'98 Article 38 encourages the respective parties to attempt to for-
mulate a friendly settlement.'" Parties willing to negotiate not only acceler-
ate the resolution process, but also actively participate in forging a mutually
beneficial agreement in accord with Article 9 principles.
The viability of Article 38 is illustrated by the success of a recent
friendly settlement reached on March 9, 1998 between the Christian Asso-
ciation of Jehovah's Witnesses and Bulgaria.2" The applicant association ap-
197. Id. at 1365,148.
198. The full text of Article 38 (previously numbered Article 28, prior to the enactment
of Protocol 11), "Examination of the case and friendly settlement proceedings" reads as fol-
lows:
1. If the Court declares the application admissible, it shall:
(a) pursue the examination of the case, together with the representatives of the par-
ties, and if need be, undertake an investigation, for the effective conduct of which
the States concerned shall furnish all necessary facilities;
(b) place itself at the disposal of the parties concerned with a view to securing a
friendly settlement of the matter on the basis of respect for human rights as defined
in the Convention and the protocols thereto.
2. Proceedings conducted under paragraph lb shall be confidential.
Convention for Protection of Human Rights, supra note 4.
199. See VAN DUK & VAN HOOF ET AL., supra note 100, at 178-92.
200. See European Commission of Human Rights, App. No. 28626/9-5, Christian Asso-
ciation Jehovah's Witnesses against Bulgaria, Report of the Commission (adopted Mar. 9,
1998) (visited May 30, 1999) <http://www.dhcour.coe.fr/hudoc/Vie.. .icemode=&Related-
Mode--O&X=530204815>.
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plied to the European Commission after the Bulgarian Council of Ministers
refused to re-register the religious association under the amended Bulgarian
law and the Bulgarian Supreme Court dismissed subsequent appeals."'
Once the petition was declared admissible, the European Commission
invited the parties to negotiate a friendly settlement in accord with Article 38
of the Convention. The exchange of correspondence and proposals soon led
to several meetings and conferences between the parties, culminating in a
friendly settlement approved by the European Commission on March 9,
1998.2" The settlement permitted the applicant association to duly register 3
and established the framework for future conferences to address and resolve
arising concerns."
The growing awareness of the responsibilities delineated in Article 9 is
similarly illustrated by the recent friendly settlement reached between Mr.
Tsavachidis and Greece. 5 After approving the settlement achieved by the
Tsavachidis applicant, the court noted that the Kokkinakis and Manoussakis
"rul[ings] under Article 9 of the Convention... clarified the nature and ex-
tent of the Contracting States' obligations.""4 Thus, the friendly settlements
201. See id. The applicant had duly registered with the Bulgarian government in 1991, as
required under the Persons and Family Act. In 1994, this same Act was amended, requiring
religious associations to re-register subject to the consent of the Council of Ministers. The ap-
plicant applied to the Council of Ministers to re-register. After some delay, on June 28, 1994
the Council of Ministers refused the authorization with the sole rationale that the decision was
based on the amended Act. See id. The applicant association did not receive an official copy
of this decision, but only became aware of the decision, when police action was taken in the
town of Haskovo on August 5, 1994. See id. On September 15, 1994 the applicant appealed
the Ministers' decision, but the Supreme Court subsequently dismissed the appeal. As a result
of the Supreme Court decision, the applicant became subject to arrests, dispersal of meetings
held in public and private locations and confiscation of religious material. See id. Thus, the
applicant applied to the European Commission of Human Rights alleging breaches of Articles
6, 9, 10, 11, and 14. See id.
202. See id.
203. See id. In exchange for withdrawing the application to the European Commission,
the Bulgarian government resolved to provide alternative civil service to conscientious objec-
tors. Additionally, the applicant association agreed to refrain from dictating health care to its
members (although it had not previous done so), thus assuring the full exercise of free will
and liberty of choice of its members. See id. The Bulgarian government additionally promised
to officially register the Christian Association of Jehovah's Witnesses as a religious organiza-
tion, as long as said organization continued to abide by all national laws applying to religious
entities. See id. The government also agreed to withdraw all arrests or accusations previously
filed against members of the applicant association and the Director of Religious Affairs re-
solved to abide by all the terms of the friendly settlement. See id.
204. See id. As a result of the friendly settlement, on May 17, 1999, the parties held
their first joint conference in Sofia (Bulgaria). Interview with James McCabe, Esq., in San
Diego, Cal. (May 31, 1999).
205. See European Court of Human Rights, Case of Tsavachidis v. Greece, App. No.
28802/95, Jan. 21, 1999 (visited Feb. 24, 1999) <http://www.dhcour.coe.fr/hudoc
/Vie.. .icemode=&RelatedMode=0&X=22503091 1>. Mr. Tsavachidis applied to the Euro-
pean Court asserting that the Greek National Intelligence Service kept him under surveillance
because he was one of Jehovah's Witnesses and he was responsible for organizing religious
meetings of his faith. See id.
206. Id.
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reached in Bulgaria and Greece suggest that the Court's prior "clarification"
served to emphasize and remind member states of their obligation to abide
by the principles expressed in Article 9. Ideally, as the European Court dem-
onstrates an increasing willingness to analyze alleged Article 9 violations,
member states will strive to rectify incidents of religious intolerance on a na-
tional level instead of waiting until future petitioners apply to the European
Court.
IV. APPLYING ARTICLE 9 TO ADDRESS RELIGIOUS
INTOLERANCE IN FRANCE
Despite advances in the application of Article 9, an immediate solution
to the current infringement of religious freedom in France is unforeseeable
due to the lengthy legal process. To submit an application to the European
Court of Human Rights, petitioners must first exhaust all domestic remedies
as required by Article 35 of the European Convention." As such, the re-
spondent state is provided the opportunity to redress the alleged violation
within the framework of its own domestic legal system."' However, due to
the lengthy legal process,"° targeted religious minorities may suffer irrepara-
ble damage before their petitions are brought before the European Court.1
Thus, in order to attempt to expedite the legal procedure, persecuted reli-
gious minorities in France have sought both domestic and international
207. The full text of Article 35 (previously numbered Article 26, prior to the enactment
of Protocol No. 11) reads as follows:
1. The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been
exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of'international law, and
within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.
2. The Court shall not deal with any application submitted under Article 34 that is
anonymous; or is substantially the same as a matter that has already been exam-
ined by the Court or has already been submitted to another procedure of interna-
tional investigation or settlement and contains no relevant new information.
3. The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted under
Article 34 which it considers incompatible with the provisions of the Convention
or the protocols thereto, manifestly ill-founded, or an abuse of the right of applica-
tion.
4. The Court shall reject any application which it considers inadmissible under this
Article. It may do so at any stage of the proceedings.
Convention for Protection of Human Rights, supra note 4.
208. See VAN DUK & VAN HOOF ET AL., supra note 100, at 127.
209. In 1995, the average case took five years to work its way through the Convention
procedure. See Richardson, supra note 80, at 43. In Kokkinakis, approximately seven years
elapsed between Mr. Kokkinakis's original 1986 proselytism conviction and the 1993 Euro-
pean Court decision. Likewise, in Manoussakis, the Petitioners waited 10 years to be heard by
the European Court. See supra Part III.A-B.
210. See U.S. Dept. of State, supra note 10. Discriminatory tax claims asserted against
the Church of Scientology in 1994-1995 forced several Scientology churches into bankruptcy
in France. See id.
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remedies. An examination of the Tavernier, Gluchowski, Piechota v.
France"' petition recently submitted to the European Court of Human
Rights, illustrates the domestic and international hurdles faced as religious
minorities seek legal remedies to curtail the increased religious intolerance
in Europe.
A. Domestic Remedies in France
After forty years of silence, in 1993 the European Court first articulated
and defined the rights expressed in Article 9.2 The recent Kokkinakis and
Manoussakis decisions serve to reinforce the responsibility of each member
state to safeguard the religious freedom of all European citizens."' There-
fore, as a prominent founding member state of the European Convention," '
the French judiciary should adhere to the principles embodied in Article 9
when reviewing petitions involving the discrimination and persecution of re-
ligious minorities."' Ideally, French courts will respond to the European
Court's interpretation of Article 9 and the friendly settlements reached in
Bulgaria and Greece and seek resolution on a national level."6
Nevertheless, recent legal challenges in France indicate that French
courts are unwilling to address the issue of increased national religious intol-
erance."7 Despite some success in pursuing libel and slander suits against
representatives of the national anti-cult organization,"' French courts have
211. See Tavernier, supra note 26.
212. See Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22.
213. See id.
214. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
215. The French Constitution, under Article 55, automatically incorporates ratified inter-
national treaties into the French national legal system and grants treaties and international
agreements precedence over national legislation. As such, Article 9 would take precedence
over all French legislation with the exception of the French Constitution. See WALTER CAIRNS
& ROBERT MCKEON, INTRODUCTION To FRENCH LAW 13-14 (1995). In reality, although the
Court de Cassation has accepted treaties over national lois (law) since 1975, the Conseil
d'Etat (the highest French court of administrative jurisdiction) did not accept the supremacy
of treaties over domestic legislation until 1989. See VAN DUK & VAN HOOF ET AL., supra note
100, at 17. However, even if a French court were to rule in favor of a petitioner of a religious
minority, this outcome might not impact future cases brought by religious minorities because
French courts generally do not rely on jurisprudence, as does the legal system in the United
States. See CHRISTIAN DADOMO & SUSAN FARRAN, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 41-43 (1996).
216. See supra Part III.
217. See Tavernier, supra note 26.
218. See id. (petition at 7). Numerous slander and libel suits have successfully been
brought against representatives of the national anti-cult organization UNADFI by the national
Association of Jehovah's Witnesses in France, under the French legislation of 1881 governing
the freedom of the press. For example, on January 15, 1997, the chairwoman of the UNADFI
branch in Northern France, Mrs. Lydwine Ovigneur, was found guilty of slander by the Ap-
peal Court of Douai for having stated on public radio that "as for the guru, the director, the
group in Brooklyn that directs Jehovah's Witnesses, it's not a guru, it's a group of 12 indi-
viduals. In my opinion, those people are drug dealers, procurers (pimps), and pro-slavery." Id.
1999]
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demonstrated a general reluctance to abide by constitutional, 29 statutory,
20
and international 2' provisions protecting freedom of religion.
Recently, the Conseil d'Etat,222 the highest French court of administra-
tive jurisdiction, rejected a complaint submitted by Petitioners Tavernier,
Gluchowski and Piechota, that alleged that the French government had vio-
lated the Petitioners' right to freedom of religion.223 The complaint stated that
the government's sponsorship of the anti-cult organization "National Union
of Associations for the Defense of the Family and the Individual" (Union
Nationale des Associations pour la Defense des Familles et de l'lndividu)
(UNADFI)" ' violated the Petitioners' right to freedom of religion. 2 The Pe-
titioners argued that the endowment of official government recognition and
"public interest" status to the UNADFI constituted a blatant government
219. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
220. The French law (lot) of 1905 delineates the separation between Church and State in
the following provision:
Sont punis d'une amende de 10,000 Francs, ceux qui, par voies de fait, violences
ou menaces contre un individu, soit en lui faisant craindre de perdre son emploi ou
d'exposer un dommage A sa personne, sa famille, ou sa fortune, l'auront d6termin6
i exercer ou i s'abstenir d'exercer un culte, ii faire partie ou ii cesser de faire partie
d'une association cultuelle, A contribuer ou A s'abstenir de contribuer aux frais
d'un culte.
FR. law of 1905, Dec. 9, 1905, art. 31.
221. See supra notes 4 and 215 and accompanying text.
222. See CAIRNS & McKEoN, supra note 215, at 40-42. As the supreme court within the
administrative hierarchy, the Conseil d'Etat acts as a court of first instance, a court of appeal,
and a court of cassation (to review a point of law). See id. at 41; see also DADOMO & FARRAN,
supra note 215, at 89-95.
223. See Tavernier, supra note 26 (petition at 4).
224. See id. As a result of the report published by the Enquete Commission in 1996, the
French government issued an administrative regulatory decree on April 30, 1996 granting of-
ficial recognition to the "National Union of Associations for the Defense of the Family and
the Individual" as a charitable organization serving the public interest. The UNADFI's al-
leged purpose is "to prevent and defend families-and individuals from the practices exercised
by groups, movements and organizations having the nature of destructive cult groups/sects."
Id. The official government recognition confers upon the UNADFI's greater legal capacity,
authorization to acquire property free of charge, greater flexibility in property management,
and exemption from the value-added tax, the trade tax, the tax on donations and testamentary
bequests, and the corporation tax. See id. In effect, the Petitioners argue, this specific tax re-
gime becomes a form of government "subsidy" and economic assistance to the anti-cult or-
ganization. In addition to the economic benefits, the government recognition of the UNADFI
as "serving the public interest" conveys a special "seal of approval" which legitimizes and
provides respectability in the public's eye and leads to general public support. See id.
225. See Supplementary Petition for Tavernier, Gluchowski, Piechota v. France, Eur.
Comm'n H.R., Nov. 4, 1998 (supplementary pleading at 4, on file with author). On March 23,
1998, the Conseil d'Etat rejected the petition submitted by Petitioners Mr. Georges Tavernier,
Mr. Louis Piechota, and Mr. Philippe Gluchowski and issued a decision holding that the "of-
ficial recognition of an association as a charity serving the public interest does not of itself
infringe upon freedom of conscience and religion." Id. (supplementary pleading at 2). The
absence of rationale supporting the Conseil d'Etat's decision prompted the Petitioners to ap-
ply to the European Court of Human Rights on September 21, 1998, alleging an infringement
of their rights as outlined in Article 9, 11, and 13 of the European Convention. See id.
32
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sanction of the UNADFI's vigorous campaign to fight "destructive cult
groups/sects."226 Additionally, the Petitioners alleged that the government
sponsorship had embroiled the French government in the debate about what
criteria distinguish a religion from a cult group or sect.227 Nevertheless, the
Conseil d'Etat held that "official recognition of an association as a charity
serving the public interest does not of itself infringe upon freedom of con-
science and religion.""22 The court failed to state whether state sponsorship of
an organization devoted to campaigning and targeting religious minorities
constitutes an infringement of protected religious liberties.229 Therefore, al-
though France espouses to be a fervent supporter of religious freedom, the
current prevalent anti-cult sentiment has made it increasingly difficult, if not
impossible, for religious minorities to successfully defend their right to reli-
gious freedom on a national level.2 Thus, religious minorities seeking inter-
national remedies have applied to the European Court of Human Rights.
226. Tavernier, supra note 26 (petition at 5-7). This campaign includes: writing to the
Mayor in Lens urging him not to rent the Bollaert stadium to Jehovah's Witnesses, denying
and opposing the accounts of surviving Jehovah's Witnesses who were deported and interned
in Nazi concentration camps, actively interfering with efforts to obtain places of worship,
writing and distributing a letter to non-Witnesses dissuading them from studying the Bible
with Jehovah's Witnesses, intervention in divorce and child custody proceedings when one
spouse is a Jehovah's Witness, and alerting and attracting media support for the UNADFI's
anti-Witness campaigns. See id.
227. See id.
228. Id. (petition at 2).
229. See id. (petition at 2-4).
230. Despite the legal difficulties, religious minorities have continued to pursue domestic
remedies in the French courts under the following French Penal Codes sections:
Article 431-1 [1 ]: Hindering, in a deliberate manner and with the use of threats, the
exercise of the rights of expression, work, assembly or demonstration is punish-
able by one year of misdemeanor imprisonment and by a fine of 100,000 francs.
Article 432-4 [1]: A person exercising governmental authority or entrusted with a
mission in the public service who, in the performance or on the occasion of per-
forming his or her duties or mission, arbitrarily orders or performs an act prejudi-
cial to individual liberty is liable to a penalty of seven years of misdemeanor im-
prisonment and to a fine of 700,000 francs.
Article 432-7: Discrimination as defined in Article 225-1, when committed with
respect to a natural person or legal entity by a person exercising governmental au-
thority or entrusted with a mission in the public service, in the performance or on
the occasion of performing his or her duties or mission, is punishable by three
years of misdemeanor imprisonment and by a fine of 300,000 francs when it con-
sists of: I. Refusing the benefit of a right granted by law; 2. Hindering the normal
exercise of any economic activity.
EDWARD A. TOMLINSON, THE FRENCH PENAL CODE OF 1994, 128, 140-41, 217, 224-25, 232-
33, 248 (1999).
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B. Application to the European Court
1. Procedural Hurdles
To submit an application to the European Court of Human Rights, all
petitioners must abide by the procedural admissibility conditions set forth in
Article 35 of the European Convention."' These conditions require petition-
ers to exhaust all domestic remedies prior to applying to the European
Court. 32 Petitioners must also submit the application within six months from
the date when the final national decision was issued. 3 Additionally, Article
35 excludes applications submitted anonymously, those containing an issue
substantially similar to those previously examined by the Court, or a matter
presented to another international forum." Applicants are also precluded
from submitting applications which are not compatible with the provisions
of the European Convention, ill-founded, or in some manner an abuse of the
right to lodge an application with the European Court."' Of these require-
ments, the exhaustion of local remedies rule appears to be the most difficult
to overcome due to the lengthy legal process religious minorities will likely
face when seeking domestic remedies.236
Although the exhaustion of local remedies rule is designed to permit
"the Respondent State... an opportunity to redress by its own means within
the framework of its own domestic legal system the wrong alleged to have
been done to the individual," '237 the European Court has indicated that the
rule be applied with flexibility.238 This would permit each case to be evalu-
ated "in the light of its particular facts." '239 When judging whether a particular
applicant has exhausted all domestic remedies, the European Court must
take into account not only the particular remedies available in the legal sys-
tem of the member state, but also the general legal and political context and
the personal circumstances of the applicants." Thus, when various domestic
remedies are available to a particular applicant, the Court has dictated that
Article 35 may be applied "to reflect the practical realities of the applicants'
position,"2"' thereby permitting the applicants to exhaust only the remedy or
remedies which are reasonably likely to be effective.2"2
231. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See id; see also VAN DUK & VAN HOOF ET AL., supra note 100, at 108-62 (detailed
discussion on each admissibility condition under Article 35).
236. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
237. VAN DUK& VAN HOOFETAL., supra note 100, at 127.
238. See id. at 128.
239. Id.
240. See id.
241. Id. at 134.
242. See id.
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For example, in Manoussakis,4 3 the Greek government argued that the
applicants failed to exhaust domestic remedies because they allegedly de-
clined to challenge the implied refusal by the Minister of Education and Re-
ligious Affairs in the Supreme Administrative Court.2" The European Court
rejected the government's assertions because the petitioners' application for
a place of worship had been left in a state of uncertainty for over sixteen
years, ' and "the authorities did not in practice always comply with the deci-
sion of the Supreme Administrative Court."2" As such, the European Court
held, "an applicant who has availed himself of a remedy capable of redress-
ing the situation giving rise to the alleged violation.., is not bound to have
recourse to other remedies which would have been available to him but the
effectiveness of which is questionable."2 7
Similarly, in the recent Tavernier application submitted to the European
Court, Petitioners Tavernier, Gluchowski, and Piechota argue that all local
remedies have been exhausted because the Conseil d'Etat, the supreme ad-
ministrative court in France, rejected their petition by a decision issued on
March 23, 1998.4' If the Tavernier application is deemed admissible by the
European Court, the French government will likely counter that Petitioners
have not exhausted all domestic remedies because they can seek an appeal or
search for an alternative judicial forum to advance their claim. As in
Manoussakis, the Petitioners can rebut this assertion by reasoning that it is
unnecessary to seek an alternative recourse or remedy if the effectiveness of
such alternative is questionable. 9 Indeed, as the highest administrative court
in France rejected the petitioners' application, it is unlikely that any alterna-
tive judicial forum in France would be willing to vocally disagree with the
highest court. Additionally, the current national anti-cult movement would
likely preclude any potential relief for targeted religious minorities. Due to
these "practical realities,"2 Petitioners may persuasively argue that the gen-
eral legal and political context precludes their ability to receive a fair and
unbiased judgment in France."'
2. Substantive Hurdles
Once the procedural admissibility requirements have been overcome in
the Tavernier application, the European Court will likely analyze the alleged
243. 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
244. See Manoussakis, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1358, 1 31.
245. Id. at 1359-60, 33.
246. Id. at 1360, 133.
247. Id. at 1359, 1 33.
248. See Tavernier, supra note 26 (petition at 4-5).
249. See Manoussakis, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1359, 33.
250. VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF ET AL., supra note 100, at 134.
251. See id. at 128.
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Article 9 breach under the three-pronged test applied in the Kokkinakis 2 and
Manoussakis2. 3 decisions. To do so, the European Court will first examine
whether the French government's sponsorship of the UNADFI is in fact
"prescribed by law. "2"4 The Court will then assess whether the French gov-
ernment has a "legitimate aim" in officially supporting an anti-cult
organization.25 Finally, the Court will determine whether the Government's
official recognition and sponsorship of the UNADFI is "necessary in a
democratic society. "256
a. "Prescribed by law"
Unlike the Kokkinakis257 and Manoussakis258 cases, the Tavernier peti-
tion does not contest a specific codified law.259 Instead, the Petitioners chal-
lenge the French government's official recognition of the UNADFI, an or-
ganization which blatantly campaigns against "destructive cult
groups/sects. '2" As the French Constitution precludes the government from
legislating or legally restricting the religious activities of its citizens, 261 Peti-
tioners argue that the UNADFI serves to accomplish what the government
cannot legally achieve.2 62 Thus, Petitioners assert that the French government
has violated Article 9 of the European Convention by sanctioning the
UNADFI's campaign to target and eradicate religious minorities.263
In response to the Petitioners' arguments, the French government will
likely counter by arguing that the alleged Article 9 breach is completely un-
founded because the Tavernier petition fails to set forth a particular French
law which allegedly infringes on the Petitioners' religious liberties.2" Fur-
thermore, even if the administrative action of granting official recognition to
the UNADFI is scrutinized as a 'national law,' the French government will
contend that the government cannot be held responsible for the actions of a
private organization because the rights embodied in Article 9 apply solely to
252. 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
251. 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A) (1996).
254. See Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18, 36.
255. Id.
256. See id.
257. 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
258. 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1996).
259. See Tavernier, supra note 26 (petition at 4-5).
260. Id.
261. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
262. See Tavernier, supra note 26 (petition at 4-5).
263. See id. Petitioners do not challenge the right of the UNADFI, as a private organiza-
tion, to express their opinion. However, when the French State becomes involved in criticiz-
ing religious denominations, whether directly or by means of a third party, Petitioners assert
that this action directly violates both constitutional and statutory provisions in France. See id.
(petition at 12).
264. See id. (petition at 12).
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the actions taken by European governments, not private citizens."
In response to these arguments, the European Court is likely to take into
consideration various factors to determine whether the Petitioners have
overcome the threshold "prescribed by law" requirement. In Manoussakis,
the European Court chose not to rule on whether the Greek decree endowing
the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs with discretionary powers to
grant or deny applications to build places of worship was "prescribed by
law." Instead, the European Court briefly indicated that, "in any event, [the
Greek law] was incompatible with Article 9 of the Convention on other
grounds." 67 Likewise, the European Court could find that the French Parlia-
ment not only bestowed "public interest" recognition upon the UNADFI, but
also conveyed discretionary duties "to prevent and defend families and indi-
viduals from the practices exercised by groups, movements and organiza-
tions having the nature of destructive cult groups/sects."6 8 If such were the
case, not only would the French Parliament be sponsoring the UNADFI's ac-
tivities, but also, in essence, empowering the UNADFI as a tool of the
French government." The fact that the UNADFI existed and vocally ex-
pressed its anti-cult perspectives prior to receiving "public interest" status,
lends credence to the Petitioners' argument that, in the face of an admitted
inability to openly legislate and pass an 'anti-cult' law, the French govern-
ment instead chose to designate a private organization to pursue a campaign
against religious minorities.27
b. "Legitimate Aim"
Assuming the European Court concedes the existence of a French law or
administrative decree, the European Court will next undertake an analysis of
whether the existence of a government sponsored anti-cult organization
serves the "legitimate aim" of fostering public order, health, or morals and
the rights and freedoms of others. 7' The Petitioners will assert that an or-
ganization which blatantly campaigns against religious minorities cannot
possibly be pursing the "legitimate aim" of promoting the rights and free-
doms of all French citizens. 72 Further, the Petitioners may strengthen their
265. See id.
266. See Manoussakis, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1362, 38.
267. Id.
268. Tavernier, supra note 26 (petition at 4).
269. See id. (petition at 11-12). In support of the UNADFI, the French Minister of the
Interior commented, "I therefore consider that, contrary to the petitioners' claims, the nature
of UNADFI, which provides valuable assistance to the public authorities, as a charity serving
the public interest is sufficiently established and justified its official recognition in this capac-
ity." Id. (petition at 12).
270. See Supplementary Petition for Tavernier, Gluchowski, Piechota, supra note 225
(supplemental pleading at 4).
271. See Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18, 1 36.
272. See Tavernier, supra note 26 (petition at 10).
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argument by referring to the thirty-eight enclosures included in their petition
which document the pervasive anti-cult campaign carried out by the
UNADFI throughout France.273
However, the French government will likely defend its sponsorship of
the UNADFI on the basis that the national anti-cult association assists in
protecting French citizens from nefarious cults which prey upon innocent
and naive individuals.27 The French government will undoubtedly refer to
the recent cases of religiously motivated mass suicides to emphasize the ur-
gent and legitimate need to protect the French public. "
In Kokkinakis, the European Court found the Greek anti-proselytism law
to have the "legitimate aim" of protecting citizens from "attempts to influ-
ence them by immoral and deceitful means."'26 Similarly, the European
Court is likely to determine that the government sponsored UNADFI also
has the "legitimate aim" of "provid[ing] valuable assistance to the public au-
thorities""27 in their "determination to use all legal means to fight against cer-
tain actions by sectarian groups and their leaders.""2 8 Unlike the wealth of
Greek national law which defined "proselytism" in the Kokkinakis case,"9
Petitioners may counter that neither the French government nor the UNADFI
have defined the objective criteria to be used to determine which minority
religions should be categorized as "dangerous. ' 2" Furthermore, for the
French government to endeavor to evaluate and distinguish "religions" from
"cults" would clearly embroil the government in a debate at odds with the
spirit and letter of Article 9."'
Nevertheless, the growing acceptance of parliamentary commissions
and observatories established to investigate religious organizations suggests
that the European Court is likely to disregard the Petitioners' assertions. Re-
cently, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe282 recom-
mended the formation of a European Observatory on Cults and New Reli-
gious Movements to investigate new religious movements in Europe.2"3
273. See id. (petition at "list of enclosures").
274. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
275. See id.
276. Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20, 1 42.
277. Tavernier, supra note 26 (petition at 11).
278. Id. (petition at 12).
279, See Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 19, 1 40.
280. See Tavernier, supra note 26 (petition at 8).
281. See id.
282. The Parliamentary Assembly acts as the statutory organ of the Council of Europe.
See An Assembly for the Whole of Europe (visited Nov. 7, 1999) <http://stars.coe.fr/apropos/
Presentation/AssemblyE.htm>. Although not directly involved in the European Court's deci-
sion making process, members of the European Court on Human Rights are elected by the
Parliamentary Assembly. See Sessions and Sittings (visited Nov. 7, 1999)
<http://stars.coe.fr/a propos/Presentation/SessionsE.htm>.
283. See Conunittee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Illegal Activities of Sects, Par-
liamentary Assembly Report, Doc. 8373, Apr. 13, 1999 (visited Aug. 20, 1999)
<http://stars.coe.fr/doc/doc99/edoc8373.htm>.
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Although the Parliamentary Assembly does not take part in the judicial de-
liberations of the European Court, the issuance of this alarming recommen-
dation by the legislative body of the Council of Europe suggests the per-
petuation of a disturbing trend to deny religious freedom to organizations
perceived to be "new religious movements. ''
c. "Necessary in Democratic Society"
In determining whether the creation of a government sponsored anti-cult
organization can be defined as "necessary in a democratic society," the
European Court will likely first analyze whether the measures taken in
France were justified in principle, and second, whether the restriction
imposed is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.8 In doing so, the
European Court will strive to balance the perceived danger against the
measures taken at the national level. 6
When examining whether the state sponsorship of the UNADFI is
justified in principle, the French government will likely reiterate the
government's duty to protect its citizens from the insidious ploys of
dangerous cults preying on the innocent and inexperienced. Although the
concept of establishing an observatory on religious minorities might appeal
to legislators attempting to protect their constituants from dangerous mind-
manipulating cults, the Petitioners will assert that both the national
constitution and international agreements prohibit government intermeddling
in religious affairs."
In Manoussakis, the Court characterized the challenged law as having a
"general policy of obstruction." '288 Likewise, the Petitioners in Tavernier may
also argue that the government sponsorship of the UNADFI obstructs the
religious freedom guaranteed to all French citizens because the UNADFI
openly targets and campaigns against specific "undesirable" religious
minorities. 9 By endowing the UNADFI with authority to "defend families
and individuals from ... destructive cult groups/sects," the Petitioners will
argue that the French government has empowered a private organization
with the authority to determine which religious minorities should be targeted
and what tactics will be used against these organizations. As it is unknown
how the UNADFI determines which religious groups to surveill, religious
minorities have little recourse when subjected to attack by the UNADFI.
Thus, Petitioners will argue that the restrictions imposed are not proportional
to the alleged legitimate aim of protecting French citizens from dangerous
cults because the sponsorship of the UNADFI permits the French
284. See id.
285. See Manoussakis, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1364,144.
286. See Gunn, supra note 20, at 322.
287. See Tavernier, supra note 26 (petition at 9).
288. See Manoussakis, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1363, 38.
289. See Tavernier, supra note 26 (petition at 10).
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government to assume the role of religious arbitrator and become involved
determining what factors distinguish "religions" from "cults." '
The French government will counter that in the face of numerous cult
induced mass suicides, the government has a duty to take steps to protect
French citizens from the influence of dangerous cults."' Instead of creating
anti-cult legislation as some members of the Commission initially suggested,
the French government sought to separate itself from the debate by granting
official recognition to a well established organization. The UNADFI
allegedly is dedicated "to prevent[ing] and defend[ing] families and
individuals from the practices exercised by groups, movements and
organizations having the nature of destructive cult groups/sects."' ' "
The Petitioners can assert that if sectarian groups are accused with
"offenses under the law," it is the duty of the state prosecutor, and not a
private organization, to investigate and prosecute those individuals that
violate the law.293 Nevertheless, in light of the recommendation recently
released by the Parlimentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the
European Court is likely to deem government sponsorship of a private anti-
cult organization as "necessary in a democratic society."294
d. Analysis
Although the Kokkinakis and Manoussakis decisions provide some op-
timism regarding the European Court's growing willingness to examine al-
leged violations of Article 9, the current European anti-cult sentiment sug-
gests that the Tavernier petition faces substantial obstacles. As the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recently issued a recom-
mendation proposing the creation of a European Observatory on Cults and
Sects, it is unlikely that the European Court will rule in a manner opposing
the Assembly's recommendation.295 Thus, religious minorities continue to
shoulder the burden of advancing and defending the fundamental right to
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion guaranteed in Article 9 of the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
CONCLUSION
The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms purports to advance the maintenance and increased recognition of hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms. Once the European Convention be-
came effective, all State signatories became legally bound to abide by the
290. See id.
291. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
292. Tavernier, supra note 26 (petition at 4).
293. See id. (petition at 11).
294. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
295. See id.
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terms and conditions of the treaty. This, in turn, permitted individuals who
had exhausted all domestic remedies to file complaints in the European
Court of Human Rights to seek redresses for alleged breaches of the
Convention.
As a signatory member, France is bound to abide by all the conditions
of the European Convention, including Article 9, which guarantees the free-
dom of thought, conscience and religion. Nevertheless, the current rise of re-
ligious intolerance, fomented in part by the French Parliamentary Enquete
Commission's report and the increasing activism of publicly funded anti-cult
groups, has created a two-tiered religious system which legally strips reli-
gious minorities of their constitutional rights. Therefore, affected religious
minorities in France should apply to the European Court arguing that the
current discriminatory trends violate Article 9.
Although over forty years passed before the European Court identified
the first Article 9 violation, the Kokkinakis and Manoussakis cases provide
some optimism that the European Court is now more willing to interpret and
analyze the rights of conscience as delineated in Article 9. Nevertheless,
both Kokkinakis and Manoussakis indicate that the European Court contin-
ues to give great deference to the "legitimate aim" advanced by the govern-
ment to justify restricting rights of conscience. Thus, persecuted religious
minorities should continue to pursue both domestic and international reme-
dies in order to increase the likelihood of curtailing the rising religious intol-
erance in Europe.
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